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This dissertation examines how management control system design affects 
dysfunctional behaviors. It also analyses individual reactions to peers’ 
dysfunctional behaviors. Dishonesty in performance reporting is analyzed as 
a key dysfunctional behavior in organizations. Specifically, it is analyzed two 
different dishonest behaviors: (i) dishonesty in performance reporting; and 
(ii) free riding. 
In order to examine these issues, I performed three experimental studies. 
Since management control systems are not effective in the same extent in all 
individuals, the first experimental study analyzes how management control 
system design (beliefs system vs. boundary system) affects the honesty in 
performance reporting taking into account the individual cognitive 
orientation (individualism-collectivism). Results of this study show that 
individuals with a predominant individualist cognitive orientation were 
more dishonest when they reported their results. Results also show that 
individualists were more dishonest under a boundary system than under a 
beliefs system.  
The second study focuses on examining how relative performance feedback 
(RPF) affects individual performance when individuals are rewarded by a 
team performance-based system. Specifically, this study analyzes the effects 
of RPF when it provides information about team members (intra-group RPF) 
or about several teams (inter-group RPF). Results show that intra-group RPF 
has a negative effect on individual performance. Results also show that inter-
group RPF mitigates this negative effect. 
The third study analyzes the effects of individuals’ fairness perception and 
inter-group RPF on whistleblowing decisions. Results of this study show that 




Results also suggest that when individuals perceive their supervisor as fair, 
they will be more likely to report peers’ overstatement. This only happens 
when inter-group RPF is absent rather than present. 
This dissertation contributes to the management accounting research in 
several ways. First, it extends the evidence about how individuals are 
motivated by factors different to conventional monetary incentives. 
Specifically, it focuses on the importance that social comparison have in 
individual behaviors and it suggests that management control system design 
has an important role on it. Second, this dissertation not only focuses on the 
antecedents of dysfunctional behaviors, but also it focuses on analyzing how 
individuals react when they observe peers’ dishonest behaviors. Third, this 
dissertation analyzes the interactive effect of control systems with other 
control systems, organizational practices and individual cognitive 
orientation. Finally, this dissertation has implications for management in 
practice. It provides evidence about when management control systems have 
positive or negative effects on individual behaviors in organizations. 
Therefore, the results of this dissertation could help managers to design 
suitable management control systems in order to motivate behaviors in 
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1.3. Management control system design 
1.4. Research questions and contributions 





The general objective of this dissertation is to examine how management 
control system (MCS) design influences dysfunctional behaviors in 
organizations. With this end, I conducted three experimental studies. In 
the first one, I tested the hypotheses related to how (dis)honesty in 
performance reporting is influenced by the relationship between the 
design of management control systems and the cognitive orientation. The 
second one, it is focused on how relative performance feedback (RPF) 
affects individuals performance. Finally, the last experimental study 
analyzes the effects of fairness perception and inter-group RPF on 
whistleblowing decisions. 
This dissertation combines economic theories with psychological theories 
about individual behaviors. Control systems which are designed based on 
the assumption that individuals act opportunistically to maximize their 
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profit are not always optimal (Hannan, 2005; Rankin, Schwartz & Young, 
2008; Rigdon, 2009). Traditional economic theory assumes that 
individuals are only motivated by their self-interest and their wealth 
maximizing (Birnberg, 2011). However, behavioral and psychology 
research highlights that individuals do not behave in a totally self-
interested manner, but they conform to certain norms such as fairness, 
equity, trust, honesty, or a willingness to cooperate (Birnberg, 2011). 
Therefore, a better integration of psychology and accounting research is 
needed in order to better understand how individuals are motivated in 
organizations by management control systems. 
In this chapter, I explain the motivation of this study. In the section 2 of 
this chapter, I define dysfunctional behavior and explain the importance to 
analyze the specific behaviors that I analyze in this dissertation.  The 
section 3 highlights the importance to analyze how management control 
system design affects dysfunctional behaviors. Then, I present the 
research questions that this dissertation tries to answer and the main 
contributions (section 4). I finalize this chapter with the dissertation 
outline (section 5).  
 
1.2. Dysfunctional behaviors in organizations 
In organizations, individuals decide whether to act in favor of their own 
interest or in pro of common benefit of their group or organization 
(Probst, Carneavale & Triandis, 1999). They may behave in a dysfunctional 
way in order to meet only their own interests. Dysfunctional behaviors 
could be defined as behaviors carried out by an individual or group of 
individuals which have negative consequences for other individual, group 
and/or the organization itself (Griffin & Lopez, 2005). 
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This dissertation examines the effects of management control systems 
design in an important dysfunctional behavior: dishonest behavior. 
Dishonest behaviors not only may have harmful consequences for the 
organization, but also they may have harmful consequences for co-
workers or teammates. Thus, this research focuses on two different 
dishonest behaviors: (i) one which has negative consequences for the 
organization (dishonesty in performance reporting); and (ii) another one 
which can have negative consequences in a team or group (free riding). 
Concerns over honesty in managerial reporting have long been recognized 
in accounting literature (Birnberg, 2011; Mittendorf, 2006). In 
organizations, individuals have private information that they can use to 
their self-interest. Related to this, agency theory suggests that individuals 
are dishonest when they benefit from it (Gneezy, 2005; Rankin et al., 
2008). However, several studies have found that people are not 
completely dishonest as is predicted by the agency theory (Evans, Hannan, 
Krishnan & Moser, 2001; Hannan, Rankin & Towry, 2006; Rankin et al., 
2008). This result could be explained because individuals not only have 
preferences for benefits that they obtain of their dishonest behavior, but 
also for being honest (Luft, 1997; Birnberg, 2011). 
On the other hand, the raised use of teams in organizations (Kozolowski & 
Ilgen, 2006) has also increased the interest of researchers for the 
dysfunctional behaviors in teams. The mere fact of adopting a team-based 
structure in organizations does not lead to better performance. In 
contrast, it may result in a lack of coordination and motivation (Schnake, 
1991; Wegge & Haslam, 2005), which as consequence could arouse that 
individuals behave in a dysfunctional manner. Social loafing and free-
riding behaviors are two main dysfunctional behaviors which take place in 
teams (Kidwell & Bennet, 1993; Schnake, 1991; Wegge & Haslam, 2005). 
Rowe (2004) states that social loafing arises when all team members 
withhold their contributions to an equal degree. On the other hand, it is 
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considered that an individual behaves as free-rider when he/she benefits 
without contributing to the achievement to the group’s joint performance 
(Rowe, 2004). 
Accounting literature has focused extensively on the antecedents of these 
dysfunctional behaviors and on how mitigate them (e.g. Hannan et al., 
2006; Kidwell & Bennet, 1993; Maas & Van Rinsum, 2013; Rowe, 2004; 
Rowe, Birnberg & Shields, 2008). However, less research has focused on 
how individuals behave when they know or perceive that their peers are 
behaving in a dysfunctional way (Mulvey & Klein, 1998; Tata, 2002). 
Further analysis on this issue is needed since individual behaviors could 
have important consequences on peers’ behaviors, such as dishonest 
behaviors (Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2009) and performance (Schnake, 1991; 
Tata, 2002).  
The perception that one or various members of a team are contributing 
less to the group’s output than they could do, have significant implications 
for team performance (Tata, 2002). When an individual know or perceive 
that his/her teammates are behaving as free-rider, they may decide to 
withhold effort to avoid being exploited by their teammates (Kerr, 1983; 
Schnake, 1991). This effect is known as sucker effect. Therefore, it is not 
only important to analyze how a management control system design 
influences dysfunctional behaviors, but also how it influences individual 
behaviors when individuals observe peers’ dysfunctional behaviors. 
Furthermore, when individuals observe teammates’ dysfunctional 
behaviors, management control systems not only can influence individual 
performance, but also it may influence other individual behaviors and 
decisions, such as peer reporting decisions. Peer reporting arouses diverse 
and conflicting opinions (Reuben & Stephenson, 2012). In the literature, 
several studies suggest that some motivations could encourage people to 
report peers’ dishonest behaviors (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Reuben & 
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Stephenson, 2012). However, research on whistleblowing has found that 
employees are generally reluctant to report such misconducts (Robertson, 
Stefaniak & Crutis, 2011). Therefore, further research is needed to better 
understand how and which factors affect peer reporting decisions. 
 
1.3. Management control system design 
Management control systems are able to incentive and motivate behaviors 
in individuals towards organization’s interest (Henri, 2006; Naranjo-Gil & 
Hartmann, 2007). Thus, a suitable design of management control system 
could reduce the dysfunctional behaviors in organizations. In this vein, it is 
important to understand how different control system designs influence 
dysfunctional behaviors in organizations. Based on Simons’ control 
framework, this dissertation analyzes how management control system 
design influences dysfunctional behaviors. Furthermore, based on relative 
performance feedback research this dissertation examines how 
individuals react to peers’ dysfunctional behaviors.  
I try to extend the Simons’ framework to individual behaviors in 
organizations. Simons (1995) defines four levers of management control 
systems: beliefs system, boundary system, diagnostic system and 
interactive systems. This dissertation focuses on the levers of management 
control systems related to the design: beliefs and boundary systems. The 
beliefs system is used to define, communicate and reinforce the values, 
purposes and the organization direction (Simons, 1995). On the other 
hand, the boundary system communicates the actions which have to be 
avoid (Simons, 1995). It sets explicit limits and rules that must be 
respected (Simons, 1995). Both systems could facilitate that individuals 
compare their own behaviors with desirable organizational behaviors. 
This fact motivates individuals to reduce their dysfunctional behaviors 
(Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008). Therefore, beliefs system and boundary 
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system could be used to counteract undesirable behaviors (Widener, 
2007). However, these systems do not work in the same way in all 
individuals (Scott, 2011), since they have different emotional responses 
and cognitive orientations (Drach-Zahavy, 2004; Tessier & Otley, 2012). 
On the other hand, relative performance feedback research has focused on 
analyzing the effect of providing this information on performance. This 
research has based on social comparison theory mainly, which suggests 
that relative performance feedback will have positive effects on 
performance (Hannan, Krishnan & Newman, 2008; Tafkov, 2013). 
However, other factors could moderate this relationship. In this vein, 
Hannan et al. (2008) found that a relative performance feedback does not 
always influence positively on individual performance, but it depends on 
the incentive system. Relative performance feedback encourages social 
comparison (Tafkov, 2013).  The effect of this social comparison on 
individual performance could depend on how individuals are rewarded 
(Hannan et al., 2008; Tafkov, 2013). Previous research has found that 
relative performance feedback influences positively to individual 
performance when individuals are rewarded by a flat-wage or by an 
individual performance-based system (Hannan et al., 2008; Tafkov, 2013). 
However, it influences negatively when they are rewarded by a 
tournament incentive system and the feedback is sufficiently precise 
(Hannan et al., 2008). Thus, it is important further research about when 
relative performance feedback could have positive effects on individual 
behavior. 
In addition, since a relative performance feedback encourages competition 
(Garcia & Tor, 2007; Tafkov, 2013), it could affect other behaviors 
different from individual performance. In this line, when whistleblowing 
decision affects how individuals see themselves in comparison with 
others, a relative performance feedback could play an important role in 
this decision. Based on motivation for competition, individual decision 
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about covering or not his/her peers could depend on whether this 
decision influences on obtaining favorable comparisons relative to others. 
Therefore, it is important to extend the accounting literature in this issue. 
 
1.4. Research questions and contributions 
This dissertation tries to answer two general research questions: 
(1) How does management control system design influence 
dysfunctional behaviors? 
(2) How does management control system design influence individual 
behaviors when they observe peers’ dysfunctional behaviors? 
In order to answer these questions, I carried out three studies. The first 
study focuses on examining how (dis)honesty in performance reporting is 
influenced by the relationship between the design of management control 
system (beliefs system vs. boundary system) and the individualism 
cognitive orientation (Individualism-Collectivism). The results of this 
study show that: (i) individualist cognitive orientation influences 
negatively to honesty in performance reporting; and that (ii) this 
relationship is moderated by a boundary control system. Individualists 
reported their results less honestly under a boundary system rather than 
under a beliefs system. 
The second study analyzes how relative performance feedback affects 
individual performance when they work in teams, and they are rewarded 
by a group performance-based system. The results show that the negative 
effect of providing information about team members performance (intra-
group RPF) on individual performance is mitigated by providing relative 
information about other teams’ performance (inter-group RPF). 
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Finally, the third study examines the effects of individuals’ fairness 
perception of the supervisor and inter-group RPF on whistleblowing 
decision, even though individuals are not rewarded for doing so. The 
results of this study suggest that: (i) the presence of an inter-group RPF 
affects negatively to peer reporting; and that (ii) when individuals 
perceive their supervisor as fair, they will be less likely to report peers’ 
misconduct when inter-group RPF is present rather than absent.  
In order to empirically contrast the hypotheses proposed in each study, I 
conducted three experiments (one for each study). Experiments are a 
useful and appropriate mechanism for analyzing causal relations under 
pure and uncontaminated conditions (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). The 
participants of these experiments were students from Pablo de Olavide 
University in Seville (Spain). These types of participants were very 
adequate since it was not needed any specific knowledge or previous 
experience to perform the experimental tasks. 
This dissertation contributes to the management accounting literature in 
several ways. First, this research extends the levers of Simons’ framework 
to individual behaviors in organizations. Beyond the organizational 
strategic control, I show how the design of management control systems 
influences employees’ motivation, a question that Simons’ framework left 
unanswered (Adler & Cheng, 2011). To my knowledge, this is the first 
study which empirically analyzes the effect of beliefs and boundary 
systems on dysfunctional behaviors. Second, this dissertation contributes 
to the demand in accounting literature about which factors influence 
honesty and how different incentives to conventional monetary incentives 
influence honest behavior (Evans et al., 2001). Third, in line with recent 
research, results show that people not only care about their own material 
payoffs, but also they are motivated by social preferences. In addition, I 
extend previous research in management accounting by analyzing not only 
how management control system design affects dysfunctional behaviors, 
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but also how it affects to individual reactions when individuals observe 
peers’ dysfunctional behaviors. Finally, since control systems are 
implemented together other control systems or organizational practices 
(Kelly and Tan, 2010), this dissertation contributes to the management 
literature by analyzing the interactive effect of different control systems 
and organizational practices. 
This dissertation also has practical implications. My findings show that 
organizations should take into account the predominant cognitive 
orientation of individuals when they design management control systems. 
A control system which imposes coercive constraints may encourage 
feelings of psychological reactance in individuals with a cognitive 
orientation towards individualism. Furthermore, the results of this 
dissertation show how different design of management accounting 
information system influence individual decisions about: (i) whether to 
follow his/her peers and behave in a dysfunctional way; and (ii) whether 
to report peers’ misconducts. 
 
1.5. Dissertation outline 
This dissertation is structured as follows. In chapters 2, 3 and 4, I present 
the three studies that I have performed. The chapter 2 presents the study 
entitled “Honesty and Management Control System design”. In chapter 3, it 
is developed my second study entitled “Intra-group vs. Inter-group 
Relative Performance Feedback”. In the chapter 4, I present the study 
entitled “The effects of Individuals’ Fairness Perception and Inter-group 
Relative Performance Feedback on Whistleblowing decisions”. Each of 
these chapters includes different sections: an introduction, a hypotheses 
development, a description about the method used to test empirically the 
hypotheses, the results and the conclusions. Finally the last chapter 
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(chapter 5) provides a summary of this dissertation, describes the main 
contributions and conclusions, as well as identifies the limitations of this 
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Due to the existence of several accounting scandals, the reporting 
performance behavior has captured the attention of both the accounting 
researchers and the general public (Mittendorf, 2006). Individuals have 
private information they can use to their self-interest, even when it harms 
the organization. They can often use their discretion in decision-making to 
falsify their performance reporting (Maas & Matejka, 2009; Mazar, Amir & 
Ariely, 2008). Thus, an important question to analyze is how honesty in 
performance reporting can be improved or sustained in organizations 
(Evans, Hannan, Krishnan & Moser, 2001; Rankin, Schwartz & Young, 
2008). One way to meet this issue is by designing management control 
systems to motivate individuals to act for the organization’s benefit 
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(Ranking et al. 2008; Tessier & Otley, 2012). However, to be effective 
management control systems should be sensitive to the self-interest 
tendency and cognitive orientations of managers (Drach-Zahavy, 2004; 
Naranjo-Gil, Sánchez, Cuevas & López, 2012). This study analyzes the 
effect of management control system design and cognitive orientation on 
honesty in performance reporting by combining insights from the 
accounting and psychology literatures. 
In this study, honesty is defined as the tendency of individuals to avoid 
making untrue factual assertions, despite explicit or implicit incentives to 
the contrary (Evans et al., 2001; Rankin et al., 2008). Traditionally 
economic research asserts people are dishonest when they benefit from it, 
regardless of effects on the other side (Gneezy, 2005; Rankin et al., 2008). 
Agency theory assumes that when there are not incentives or contracts 
that induce an honest behavior, subordinates falsify or misrepresent their 
performance to serve their own interest (Rankin et al., 2008). However, 
several studies have found that people are not completely dishonest as is 
predicted by the agency theory (Evans et al., 2001; Hannan, Rankin & 
Towry, 2006; Rankin et al., 2008).  
These findings can be explained by equilibrium models, where individuals 
balance the utility of the gain and the disutility of being dishonest 
(Brickley, Smith & Zimmerman, 1997; Luft, 1997). Individuals have 
preferences both as being honest as benefits that they obtain of their 
dishonest behavior (Luft, 1997). On the one hand, they can prefer to 
behave honestly to meet with their value systems. In this vein, almost all 
cultures see honesty as an ethically desirable trait (Murphy, 1993). On the 
other hand, individuals are tempted by the economic benefits of behaving 
dishonestly. 
An honest reporting could be induced by monetary incentives, but this can 
be sometimes too costly (Luft & Shields, 2009). Thus, it is important to 
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analyze how different control systems, beyond the conventional monetary 
incentives, affect the behavior of performance reporting (Evans et al., 
2001). In this line, I analyze two designs of management control systems: 
beliefs and boundary control systems (Simons, 1995; Tessier and Otley, 
2012).  
A beliefs system creates positive forces by signaling the values and 
direction that managers want subordinates to adopt. On the other hand, a 
boundary system creates constraints and ensures compliance with orders, 
which are usually stated in negative terms or as minimum standards. 
Beliefs and boundary control systems can play a key role to encourage 
honest behaviors, since they facilitate that individuals think about 
desirable or standard behaviors and thus they can compare them with 
their own behavior. When this happens, honesty in performance reporting 
is higher (Mazar et al., 2008). However, beliefs and boundary control 
systems will not work in the same way in all individuals (Scott, 2001), 
since they have different emotional responses and cognitive orientations 
(Drach-Zahavy, 2004; Tessier and Otley, 2012). 
The cognitive orientation of individuals can be defined as the degree to 
which an individual directs its actions towards its own benefit 
(individualism) or towards the benefit of a group (collectivism) (Drach-
Zahavy, 2004). Thus, the individualism or collectivism orientation of 
individuals would play a key role in the honesty performance reporting, 
especially when the interests of individuals and their organizations are in 
conflicts. In this study, I propose that individuals with high individualist 
cognitive orientation will report their performance more dishonestly 
because they prioritize their own interest above the organizational goal 
(Drach-Zahavy, 2004; Xie, Roy & Chen, 2006). Furthermore, individuals 
with individualist cognitive orientation value freedom (Hofstede, 1991) 
and a boundary system limits freedom of action (Simons, 1995). Thus, I 
propose that the relationship between individualist cognitive orientation 
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and honesty in performance reporting could be more negatively under a 
boundary control system rather than a beliefs system.  
To test my research expectations I conducted an experiment with 83 post-
graduate students. The results indicate a negative relationship between an 
individualist cognitive orientation and honesty in performance reporting. 
Furthermore, the results show that a boundary design of control systems 
moderates the negative effect of individualist orientation on honesty, such 
that individualists show lower honesty in performance reporting under a 
boundary system than under a belief system.  
This study contributes to the accounting literature by showing how 
management control systems can be designed to influence employees’ 
motivation (Adler & Cheng, 2011). I also contribute to the management 
literature by examining cognitive orientation of individuals as an 
important motivational factor that can affect the honesty in performance 
reporting. Furthermore, this study shows how the non-based economic 
design of control systems can influence the honesty in managerial 
performance reporting (Evans et al., 2001). 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I 
develop the hypothesis about the relationship between cognitive 
orientation, management control systems, and honesty. The third section 
describes the experimental methodology. The fourth section presents the 
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2.2. Hypotheses development 
 
2.2.1. Honesty in performance reporting and cognitive orientation 
Psychology literature distinguishes two major cognitive orientations in 
people, which are individualism and collectivism (Llies, Wagner & 
Morgenson, 2007). Individualism refers to the cognitive orientation in 
which personal interests are accorded greater importance than the needs 
of groups or organizations (Triandis & Gelfand 1998; Wagner 1995, p. 
153). Collectivists, however, emphasize belonging to a group or 
organization (Xie et al., 2006), they give priority to group goals and 
performance over individual ones (Earley, 1994).  Individualism-
collectivism behavior can be considered as a continuous, where 
individualists emphasize the own-interest; individual achievement and 
self-reliance (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Wagner, 1995). 
A collectivist orientation prioritizes the objectives of the group, and it 
exhibits high commitment to organizational goals (Parkes, Bochner & 
Schneider, 2001). That is, individuals with a collectivist orientation prefer 
to act in a way that will not jeopardize the group to which they belong, 
even if it means the renunciation of higher individual benefits (Drach-
Zahavy, 2004; Xie et al., 2006). Xie et al. (2006) found evidence to support 
that individualists overstate more his self-rating than collectivists. 
Individualists are motivated to express their positive attributes in order to 
achieve their own goals (Triandis, 1996), even to inflate their self-
evaluation (Farh & Dobbins, 1989).  Individuals high on individualism try 
to enhance their self-image or reputation and so they can overstate their 
results in order to protect their self-image (Xie et al., 2006). That is, 
individualists can be more prone to misreporting, overstating their 
performance, with the purpose of do not jeopardize their self-image (Xie et 
al., 2006). 
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Since individualists place their own interests above those of the 
organization (Drach-Zahavy, 2004; Xie et al., 2006), they tend to ignore 
group interest if they conflict with their personal desires (Wagner, 1995). 
They are less willing to exert effort or sacrifice their own goals to achieve 
organizational purposes (Ramamoorthy & Flood, 2004). Therefore, I 
expect that individualists may prefer to make false claims although this 
will damage the organization they belong. They will be less intrinsically 
motivated to report their results honestly since they will tend to behave 
opportunistically to meet their own interest (Triandis et al., 2001). 
Consequently, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Individualists are more prone to dishonesty in performance 
reporting than collectivists. 
 
2.2.2. Cognitive orientation, design of management control systems 
and honesty in performance reporting 
Management control systems (MCS) are able to incentive and motivate 
behavior in individuals towards organization’s interest (Henri, 2006; 
Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 2007). MCS can be used to reconcile the tensions 
between self-interest of managers and their innate desire to contribute to 
the organization (Simons, 1995, p. 29). However, MCS will be more 
effective when they will be continually sensitive to the motivational and 
psychological factors of individuals (Naranjo-Gil et al., 2012; Towry, 2003), 
such as the emotional responses to control (Tessier & Otley, 2012) or 
cognitive orientation (Xie et al., 2006). 
Recently, Rigdon (2009) suggested that control systems that are designed 
based on the assumption that managers shirk and act opportunistically to 
maximize their profits, are not always optimal (Hannan, 2005; Rankin et 
al., 2008). Luft (1997) argued that individuals balance the financial 
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benefits of shirking or lying with the psychic benefits of honesty. In this 
line, Hannan et al. (2006) and Ranking et al. (2008) showed that managers 
are not as dishonest as predicted by pure selfishness. Individuals often face 
a conflict of priorities or dilemma, they prefer to act honestly, but they are 
tempted also by gains of behaving dishonestly (Mazar et al., 2008; 
Mittendorf, 2006).  
Mazar et al. (2008) stated that at the moment of temptation, individuals 
think about the standards of behaviors and compare them to their 
behavior. These standards of behavior are shown by the MCS in 
organizations (Simons, 2000, 1995). Simons (1995) identified two designs 
of MCS in organizations: belief system and boundary system. The beliefs 
system is a formal system used to define, communicate and reinforce the 
core values, purpose and direction of the organization. This system is 
created and communicated through formal documents such as credos, 
mission statements and statements of purpose (Simons, 1995, 1994). In 
contrast, boundary system communicates the actions that employees 
should avoid (Widener, 2007). It is a formal system used to set explicit 
limits and rules that must be respected. Boundary systems are created 
through codes of conduct or business rules (Simons, 1995, 1994).  
When individuals do not share the organization’s objectives and goals, it 
may result in self-interested behavior overriding organizational interest 
(Simons, 1995), such as dishonesty in performance reporting. An 
appropriate design of MCS can counteract the undesirable behavior of 
individuals (Widener, 2007), and such it may moderate the tendency of 
some managers to behave on its own interest and behave dishonestly in 
organizations. Beliefs and boundary control systems could engage 
individualists in organizational values. Thus, they can reconcile the self-
interest of individuals and organizational goals (Simons, 1995) by 
facilitating individuals to think about desired behaviors and compare them 
with their own behaviors (Mazar et al., 2008). 
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The same control system can be perceived differently by individuals (Scott, 
2001) since individuals have different emotional responses to controls 
(Tessier & Otley, 2012). Individual attitudes are positive when 
formalization enables them “to better master their tasks” and will be 
negative when it “functions as a means by which management attempts to 
coerce employees’ effort and compliance” (Adler & Borys, 1996, p. 61). 
Individualists are characterized as valuing freedoms (Hofstede, 1991), and 
thus, autonomy is a necessary and important aspect of them. The 
restrictions of the boundary control systems limit freedom of action 
(Simons, 1995, p. 47) and thus, they are likely to be viewed by 
individualists as a threat to their freedom and therefore arouse 
psychological reactance (Shen & Dillard, 2005).  
Brehm & Brehm (1981, p. 37) defined psychological reactance as “the 
motivational state that is hypothesized to occur when a freedom is 
eliminated or threatened with elimination”. Reactance produces a desire to 
restore the own interest (Shen & Dillard, 2005), which can cause behaviors 
that are at odds with the desired behaviors. Individuals can behave against 
the direction of a coercive message after encountering a threat that limits 
the freedom to choose (Seeman, Carrol, Woodard & Mueller, 2008). In this 
vein, Waterman (1981) supported that when it is perceived that 
constraints on freedom are imposed to produce cooperation or helping, 
the resulting feelings of psychological reactance will actually reduce the 
probability of pro-social and honest behaviors. 
Since boundary control systems, as opposite to beliefs control systems, are 
perceived as constraints, I would expect that it encourages feelings 
psychological reactance in managers with a predominant individualist 
cognitive orientation. This reduces the willing to exert efforts to behave 
honestly to achieve the goals of the organization (Drach-Zahavy, 2004; Xie 
et al., 2006). Thus, I expect that boundary control design leads 
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individualist to dishonest behavior in performance reporting. Therefore, I 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: Management control system design moderates the relationship 
between individualist cognitive orientation and honesty in 
performance reporting, such that this relationship is more negative 
with a boundary control design than with a belief control design. 
 
2.3. Research Method: Experimental design 
To test my hypotheses I conducted an experiment with 83 post-graduate 
students from Pablo de Olavide University in Seville (Spain). These 
subjects were chosen since no specific knowledge was necessary to 
perform the experimental task. Moreover, no accumulated experience or 
professional knowledge was necessary to know the individuals’ cognitive 
orientation. The independent variables were management control systems 
(beliefs system or boundary system) and individual’s cognitive 
orientations (cognitive orientation toward individualism). The dependent 
variable was honesty in performance reporting. 
 
2.3.1. Experimental procedure and task description 
Before participating in the experiment, subjects took a test in order to 
identify their cognitive orientation (Naranjo-Gil et al., 2012).  Then, I met 
with subjects in a different day. In this day, subjects participated in an 
experimental session. In each session, a single condition of the experiment 
was run. Subjects participated in the experiment voluntarily. Each subject 
was paid a “show-up” fee of 5€. They could increase their payoff according 
to their results obtained in the experimental activity. 
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I used Z-Tree software to program the experimental task (Fischbacher, 
2007). The task consisted in answering the maximum number of questions 
at a given time (Maas & Van Rinsum, 2013). The total number of questions 
was seventy-five, for which the individuals had ten minutes in total. Next, 
the actual number of correct answer was communicated to each individual. 
Then, they had to report how many questions they had solved correctly, 
but taking into account that their payoff was determined by this report and 
not by the actual number of correct answers (Maas & Van Rinsum, 2013). 
That is, the number of correct answers that they reported did not 
necessarily have to be the same as the actual number of questions 
answered correctly. 
Following Maas & Van Rinsum (2013), subjects were entered into a room 
in which I provided them the instructions. After all subjects read and 
understood the instructions, they were randomly provided with a 
participant code which matched the code of the computer in which they 
had to do the task. The task started at the same time on all computers. 
Subjects answered up seventy-five multiple choice questions for a 
maximum of ten minutes. All subjects got the same questions and they 
were always provided in the same order. Subjects could move to the next 
question without picking an answer, but they could not go back (Maas & 
Van Rinsum, 2013). For each question, they had twenty seconds and 
although they would not have answered the question, after these twenty 
seconds, they automatically moved to the next question. At the end of the 
ten minutes, subjects received a message in which was communicated the 
actual number of questions that they had answered correctly. Next, I asked 
for each individual the number of answers that he or she has answered 
correctly, taking into account that they were paid by the number that they 
said and not by the actual number of correct answers. Participants were 
noted that it was the figure they reported, and not the actual number of 
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correct answered, which determined the payoffs (Maas & Van Rinsum, 
2013). 
All subjects were rewarded for the amount reported, so everyone had the 
same motivation to distort information about their results (Maas & Van 
Rinsum, 2013). To preserve the anonymity of the subjects and to avoid 
they feel inhibited when reporting their outcome, they were provided with 
an identification code (we did not ask their names) (Evans et al., 2001; 
Maas & Van Rinsum, 2013). This was reinforced, making the payment to 
subjects in a separate room and by a person different from the responsible 
of the experiment (Evans et al., 2001). 
 
2.3.2. Manipulation and measures of the variables 
I measured the level of honesty, based on the ratio established by Evans et 
al. (2001), as follows: 
Level of Honesty = 1 – ((number of questions that the subject reported as 
answered correctly - the actual number of questions answered by the subject 
correctly) / (total number of questions – the actual number of questions 
answered by the subject correctly). 
I used the multitrait-multimethod approach recommended by Triandis, 
Chen & Chan (1998) to measure cognitive orientation. This test combined 
three instruments to capture the multidimensionality of individualism and 
collectivism: social content; behavior content (Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, 
Choi & Yoon, 1994); and the Yamaguchi (1994) collectivism scale 
adaptation. I communicated to the subjects that they should answer the 
questions based on what they think they would actually do, not on what 
they think they should do. Some questions that they had to answer were: 
“Are you the kind of person who is likely take time off from work to visit 
an ailing friend”; “You show resentment toward visitors who interrupt 
CHAPTER 2:  
Honesty and Management Control System Design 
36 
 
your work”; or, “You sacrifice self-interest for your parents” (Naranjo-Gil 
et al., 2012).  
Since the questionnaire instruments had different ranges and 
measurement values, I standardized each instrument score by subtracting 
the grand mean for all subjects from each individual subject’s score and 
dividing this result by the standard deviation for all subjects (Naranjo-Gil 
et al., 2012). All standardized score were summed, providing an overall 
score for each subject.  
The manipulation of management control system was based on Mazar et 
al. (2008) and Simons (1995). To my knowledge this is the first paper that 
analyzes empirically the effect of belief and boundary systems on 
individual behaviors. Mazar et al. (2008) used experiments to show that 
when attention to standards of behavior increases, individuals’ dishonesty 
will decrease. Mazar et al. (2008) used the Ten Commandments and an 
Honor Code as standards of behavior. Although the systems used by Mazar 
et al. (2008) in order to remember desirable behavior are not a boundary 
system or a beliefs system exactly; we could find similarities between 
them. On one hand, the Ten Commandments, like boundary system, 
establish clear limits on behavior and they are stated in negative terms. On 
the other hand, an honor code communicates and reinforces the values 
that must be adopted, which coincides with the main aim of belief system. 
Following Simons (2000, 1995) I created a belief control system through a 
mission statement (Appendix 2.1) and a boundary system control through 
a code of conduct (Appendix 2.2). In the case of beliefs system I provided 
the statement mission of Pablo de Olavide University in which were 
included sentences as: “...with the promotion of solidarity and human 
values such as honesty and justice” or “University hopes to form an honest, 
tolerant and responsible university community”. A statement mission is a 
way to create and communicate a formal beliefs system (Simons, 1995). In 
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this document were defined the values, purpose and directions of the 
university, that is the main characteristics of a beliefs systems that Simons 
(1995) defined.  In contrast, in the case of boundary system I provided the 
duties of students in the Pablo de Olavide University, some of these duties 
are: “Students should not neglect or harm the conservation of heritage and 
university funds” or “Students must not use or cooperate in fraudulent 
procedures in the evaluation tests in the work being undertaken or in 
official documents of the university”. This document showed students what 
they did not have to do, that is, these rules established clear rules on 
behavior and it stated in negative terms, which are key characteristics of a 




2.4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Manipulation Checks 
The questionnaire reliability test designed to check experimental 
manipulations show that subjects had a good understanding of the 
procedures and that the manipulations were successful. The subjects 
understood that they would be paid by the number of reported questions; 
regardless of the actual number of correct answers. They also understood 
that this communication was anonymous. The average score of these items 
was 3.98 and 4.70, respectively, on a scale of 1 to 5.  
The manipulation check of belief systems was carried out by four items. 
The results indicate that the mission statement of the university defined 
basic values, purpose and direction of it (3.92, SD = 1.05), these were 
defined in positive terms (4.37, SD = 0.67) and that it did not specify the 
behavior that the student must have (2.37, SD = 1.38) neither limited the 
behavior of the same (1.55, SD = 1.00). 
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On the other hand, the manipulation check of boundary systems was also 
carried out by four items. From the results I can conclude that the duties of 
the students set limits on their behavior (3.66, SD = 0.94) and were 
defined in negative terms (3.24, SD = 1.45). 
Honesty in reporting measures the degree to which subjects were not 
willing to exaggerate their results, taking into account their actual scores. 
It was calculated as 1 minus the overstatement of individuals divided by 
the maximum number of questions minus their actual score. The mean 
value of honesty in reporting was 73.43%. 
Table 2.1 (1) shows the descriptive statistics for the variables I analyzed. 
Figure 2.1 (1) shows a graphical summary of honesty in performance 
reporting. These descriptive statistics show that individualists (69.06%, 
SD=0.34) were less honest in reporting than collectivists (77.93%, 
SD=0.31), regardless of the management control system design. Under a 
beliefs system and under a boundary system collectivist were more honest 
when they report their results than individualists. However, no significant 
differences were found. The lowest mean value of honesty in performance 
reporting was found when individuals had a high individualist cognitive 
orientation and it was used a boundary control system design (62.46%, 
SD=0.42). Individualists were less honest under a boundary system than a 
beliefs system (73.68%, SD= 0.28). On the other hand, the mean value of 
honesty of collectivists was very similar under a beliefs (77.51%, SD=0.28) 
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FIGURE 2.1 (1). Honesty in performance reporting 
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Misreport in Table 2.1 (1) shows the percentage of subjects who 
overstated their results and Max-misreport indicates the percentage of 
subjects who reported that they answered correctly the maximum number 
of questions available (they report that they answered correctly seventy-
five questions). In the experiment thirty-eight people misreported their 
results (56.72%), but only two people reported that their score in the task 
was seventy-five (2.99%). This result is consistent with previous findings 
showing that people are not completely honest, but they are not as 
dishonest as predicted by pure selfishness (Evans et al., 2001; Hannan et 
al., 2006; Rankin et al., 2008). The most percentage of people who 
misreported their results was found under a beliefs system (68.42%), 
concretely when subjects were individualists (80%). On the other hand, 
the lowest percentage was found when subjects were collectivist and it 
was used a boundary system (33.33%). 
Altogether, the descriptive statistics suggest that individuals with high 
individualist cognitive orientation are more willing to overstate their 
results than collectivist and that willingness of individualists is higher 
under a boundary control system. This is consistent with my hypotheses. 
 
2.4.2. Hypotheses tests 
In order to test my hypotheses I used a 2x2 ANOVA test, which allows 
contrasting the direct and interactive effects of two or more independent 
variables simultaneously. I ran a factorial model with the cognitive 
orientation of individuals and the management control system (MCS) as fix 
factors and the honesty in performance reporting as dependent variable. 
The results of the ANOVA analysis (Table 2.2 (2)) show that there is not a 
significant direct effect of management control system (p-value=0.531), 
neither of cognitive orientation (p-value=0.230). The results also show a 
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no significant interaction effect. Therefore, hypothesis 1 (H1), which 
predicts that individualists will be more dishonest in performance 
reporting than collectivists, is not supported.  
I extend this analysis by examining the effect of cognitive orientation on 
honesty in the complete sample (it is not excluded the no management 
control system condition). Similar to ANOVA analysis, I did not find 
significant differences in honesty between individualists and collectivists 
(F=1.434, p-value=0.235). 
 
TABLE 2.2 (2). ANOVA. Effects on Honesty in performance reporting 
 Df F p-value 
Intercept 
 
1 319.681 0.000 
MCSϯ 
 




1 1.470 0.230 
MCS * Cognitive 
Orientation 
 
1 0.554 0.460 
Error 63   
ϯ This independent variable is whether the management control system is a beliefs or a 
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TABLE 2.3 (3). Simple Effects 
Source Df F Sig. 
Effect of MCS when 
cognitive orientation is 
individualist 
 
1 0.867 0.359 
Effect of MCS when 
cognitive orientation is 
collectivist 
 
1 0.007 0.933 
Effect of cognitive 
orientation under beliefs 
system 
 
1 0.173 0.680 
Effect of cognitive 
orientation under boundary 
system 
 
1 1.244 0.275 
 
 
My second hypothesis states that the design of management control 
system moderates the relationship between the cognitive orientation 
toward individualism and the level of honesty in performance reporting. I 
predicted that the relationship will be more negative with a boundary 
control systems design than with a belief control design. The simple effect 
analysis (Table 2.3 (3)) shows that there is no significant effect of cognitive 
orientation on honesty in performance reporting when it is present a 
boundary system (p-value=0.275) or  a beliefs system (p-value=0.680). In 
addition, there is no significant difference in individualist honesty when a 
beliefs system is present and when a boundary system is present (p-
value=0.359). Thus, I did not find support for hypothesis 2 (H2). 
The lack of significance may be caused by the use of cognitive orientation 
variable as a dichotomous variable. I considered individualistic subjects 
who are below the median score on the questionnaire completed, and 
collectivist those exceeding this score. This might force individuals who 
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were near the median to become individualistic, despite their cognitive 
orientation is closer to the collectivist orientation. It is therefore necessary 
to perform this analysis by considering the cognitive orientation as a 
continuous variable in which subjects have a level of individualist 
orientation. Thus, I tested my hypotheses, but using the cognitive 
orientation as a continuous variable from totally individualist towards 
totally collectivistic. Thus higher scores indicate a higher individualist 
cognitive orientation and lower scores of this variable indicate a higher 
collectivist cognitive orientation. 
First, I tested if there is a negative relationship between individualist 
cognitive orientation and the level of honesty (H1). Table 2.4 (4) shows 
support for my first hypothesis. It shows a negative and significant 
correlation coefficient between honesty and cognitive orientation toward 
individualism (-0.228, p-value<0.05).  
 
TABLE 2.4 (4). Correlation analysis (N=83) 














On the other hand, I proposed in my hypothesis 2 that this relationship 
will be more negative under a boundary control system than under a 
beliefs control system. In order to test this, I calculated Pearson correlation 
coefficient in each subsample (belief control system and boundary control 
system).  
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TABLE 2.5 (5). Correlation analysis under boundary system (N=29) 














TABLE 2.6 (6). Correlation analysis under beliefs system (N=38) 














Results in Table 2.5 (5) show a negative and significant correlation 
between individualistic cognitive orientation and honesty in performance 
reporting under a boundary system (-0.354, p-value<0.10). Furthermore, 
results in Table 2.6 (6) show a negative but non-significant relationship 
between individualist cognitive orientation and honesty in reporting 
under a beliefs control system (-0.147, p-value>0.10). These results 
support my second hypothesis. They suggest that management control 
system design moderates the relationship between individualistic 
cognitive orientation and honesty in performance reporting. A boundary 
system, rather than a beliefs system, moderates the negative relationship 
between individualist cognitive orientation and honesty in reporting, so 
that individualists show lower honesty in performance reporting under a 
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boundary system. These results are consistent with the boomerang effect 
from previous literature on psychological reactance (Shem and Dillard, 
2005; Seeman et al., 2008).  
 
2.5. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this study, I analyzed how individuals’ cognitive orientation influences 
the level of honesty when individuals report their results. I also analyzed 
the moderating effect of management control systems on the relationship 
between cognitive tendency and honesty in performance reporting. I use 
Simons´ framework (1995) to analyze how the design of management 
control system (belief vs. boundary) could influence on the dishonesty of 
individuals when they report their results. 
Results support generally my hypotheses. I found that an orientation 
towards individualism affects negatively the level of honesty in 
performance reporting. Furthermore, it was found that this relationship 
was moderated by a boundary design of management control system 
rather than by a belief control system. A boundary control system 
increased the negative influence of individualist orientation on honesty in 
performance reporting. This is consistent with previous findings that show 
that to limit the freedom of action of individuals can encourage 
psychological reactance and so, a boomerang effect (Seeman et al., 2008; 
Shem & Dillard, 2005).   Individuals with a high individualism orientation 
could feel jeopardized their autonomy under a boundary system and, in 
order to restart their freedom, they could behave against the desired 
behaviors (Seeman et al., 2008), such as it has been found in our results. 
On the other hand, beliefs system did not moderate the relationship 
between cognitive orientation and honesty in performance reporting. 
Although individuals with higher cognitive orientation toward 
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individualism were informed about values, purposes or direction of the 
organization, they prioritize their own interest above the goals of the 
organization (Naranjo-Gil et al., 2012; Triandis et al., 1998). 
Mazar et al. (2008) found that when individuals remember the standards 
of behavior and compare them with their own behavior, individuals’ 
dishonesty will drop. However, in my experiment I show that not all 
individuals behave in the same way. I found that the tendency of 
individuals to avoid making an untrue factual assertion, despite explicit or 
implicit incentives to the contrary, depends on individuals’ cognitive 
orientation (Erez & Somech, 1996; Naranjo-Gil et al., 2012). Mazar et al. 
(2008) showed that when subjects remembered the Ten Commandments, 
which establish clear limits in behavior, honesty increased. On the other 
hand, I found that the reminder of desirable or standard behaviors through 
a restrictive system, such as boundary system, have negative consequences 
for individuals’ honesty when they are individualists. In this line, I can 
conclude that the restrictive control systems could have a negative effect 
on individuals’ honesty according to their cognitive orientation.  
My results are in line with recent research that show that individuals do 
not misrepresent their results in the extent predicted (Matuszewski, 
2010). This implies that people do not only value their own material 
payoffs. As Fehr & Fischbacher (2002) and Hannan (2005) suggested, 
incentives and control systems are not always optimal if they are designed 
based on the assumption that people only care their own gain and that 
they act opportunistically to maximize their profits (Rigdon, 2009). Future 
research should analyze how non-monetary incentives, such as social 
preferences, influence the behavior of individuals in organizations. 
This study extends the levers of Simon’s framework to individual reporting 
behavior in organizations. My findings show how the design of 
management control systems influences employees’ motivation, a question 
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which Simons’ framework leaves unanswered (Adler & Cheng, 2011). 
Furthermore, I shed light on which factors influence the honesty and how 
different control systems to conventional monetary incentives influence 
honesty in performance reporting (Evans et al., 2001). 
The findings of this study also have practical implications. Managers in 
organizations should consider the predominant cognitive orientation of 
individuals when they design management control systems. They should 
consider that control systems which impose coercive constraints to 
individuals may encourage feelings of psychological reactance. At the same 
time, my study has several limitations, apart from those inherent to the 
experiment methodology, such as generalizability to a real-world setting. 
More research is required to determine whether our results are 
reproducible in other organizational environment, such as a team-based 
setting. The lack of significance across the belief system subsample could 
be simply a function of sample power and, thus, future research could 
replicate the experiment with a bigger sample.  I did not set any punitive 
sanction for the non-compliance with such rules. Boundary system warns 
that some types of behaviors will not be tolerated (Simons, 1995), but it 
cannot be effective without credible sanctions (Coleman, 1990). Future 
research could analyze the effectiveness of the boundary system when it is 
accompanied by credible penalties. Moreover, future research could 
analyze the effect of beliefs and boundary control systems used at the 
same time, since positive and negative controls are opposing forces that 
need to coexist to create dynamic tensions which in turn ensure effective 
control (Tessier & Otley, 2012). 
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As an educational space for higher education, the 
University Pablo de Olavide is in the service of society and 
is defined as a place of reflection and critical thinking 
committed to contributing to progress, with the teaching of 
respect for fundamental rights and civil liberties with the 
promotion of solidarity and human values such as honesty 
and justice, and the response to the needs and problems of 
contemporary society. The University will seek the widest 
social projection of its activities, by establishing the 
channels of cooperation and assistance to the society to 
contribute and support the social, economic and cultural. 
University hopes to form an honest, tolerant and 
responsible university community, capable of caring for and 
ensure the conservation of heritage and university funds. 
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a) Students should not disobey the laws in force, the Statutes, regulations and 
other rules that implement them. 
b) Students should not violate on their academic obligations, contributing their 
efforts to the quality of public university education. 
c) Students must not violate the participation in the electoral process led to the 
election of their representatives. 
d) Students should not disregard the responsibilities of the positions for which 
they had been selected and appointed. 
e) Students should not irresponsibly participate in assessment processes of 
educational activities and services. 
f) Students should not neglect or harm the conservation of heritage and 
university funds. 
g) Students should not disparage, insult or belittle the members of the 
university community, the staff of the collaborating or who providing 
services at the university. 
h) Students must not use or cooperate in fraudulent procedures in the 
evaluation tests in the work being undertaken or in official documents of the 
university. 
i) Students should not affect the improvement of the purposes and operation of 
the university. 
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3.2. Hypotheses development 
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Accountants play a key role in designing information and performance 
feedback to decision makers (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Tafkov, 2013). 
Relative performance feedback let individuals compare each other. Then, 
it will affect individual behaviors, since people are motivated by social 
comparisons (Luft and Shields, 2009). However, disclosing relative 
performance feedback is costly (Tafkov, 2013). Thus, accountants need to 
understand when relative performance feedback will have a positive effect 
on performance. Thus they can weigh the pros and cons of designing and 
implementing performance feedback systems (Tafkov, 2013). In order to 
contribute to this issue, this study analyzes how relative performance 
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feedback (RPF) affects individual performance when they work in teams 
and they are rewarded by a group performance-based system. Specifically, 
I analyze the effect of inter-group RPF and intra-group RPF on individual 
performance. 
Psychology literature predicts that relative performance feedback affects 
performance, even in the absence of pecuniary considerations (Hannan, 
Krishnan & Newman, 2008), since people value how they are seen by 
others and in comparison with others (Luft & Shields, 2009). Previous 
research has shown a positive effect of relative performance feedback in 
employees’ performance, when compensation is not tied to peer 
performance (Hannan et al. 2008; Tafkov, 2013). Furthermore, several 
studies state that reducing noise in the information about each other’s 
payoffs and actions increases cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games 
(Kahn & Murnighan, 1993; Miller, 1996; Sainty, 1999). In this vein, Kelly & 
Tan (2010) found evidence that the feedback system fosters trust in fellow 
employees and sustains cooperation over time. However, Hannan et al. 
(2008) found that relative performance feedback not always improves 
performance, but this depends on the incentive system. Their results,   
suggest that feedback may not always be a positive force (Kluger & DeNisi, 
1996; Hannan et al., 2008). RPF influences positively to individual 
performance under a flat-wage (Tafkov, 2013) and under an individual 
performance-based system (Hannan et al., 2008; Tafkov, 2013). However, 
under a tournament incentive system, RPF deteriorates individual 
performance if the feedback is sufficiently precise (Hannan et al., 2008). 
This study extends this issue by analyzing the effect of RPF on individual 
performance when individuals are rewarded by a group performance-
based system. 
When individuals work in teams and they are rewarding equally, 
regardless of their contributions to the group work, they often face 
incentives to shirk rather than to cooperate (Erev, Bornstein & Galili, 
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1993; Kelly & Tan, 2010). It appears the free rider problem. In this vein, 
several studies have analyzed extensively the causes of free-riding 
behavior (Kidwell & Bennet, 1993; Rowe, 2004; Rowe, Birnberg & Shields, 
2008). Significantly less research has analyzed the perceptions of free 
riding behavior (Mulvey & Klein, 1998). The perception of this behavior 
has significant implications for performance (Tata, 2002). However, little 
research has focused on how individuals behave when they know or 
perceive that their teammates are behaving as a free rider.  
Individuals can know how their teammates are behaving through an intra-
group RPF, which provides information about all team members.  
Individuals who know they will receive the same level of rewards as other 
members may experience inequity if they believe that other team 
members intend to withhold effort (Schnake, 1991). Thus these 
individuals may reduce their own contributions to the group (Kerr, 1983; 
Schnake, 1991) because they do not wish to be exploited by other team 
members. This is known as sucker effect (Karau & Williams, 2001; Kerr, 
1983; Schnake, 1991). 
On the other hand, psychological research has found that individuals not 
always will reduce their effort when they know or perceive that other 
team members have a poor performance (Wegge & Haslam, 2005; 
Williams & Karau, 1991). Even, they state that when team members value 
the team performance, individuals will increase their effort in order to 
compensate the teammates’ performance. Inter-group RPF could play a 
key role in this issue since it provides information about the performance 
of different teams. This information could facilitate the social comparison 
between teams. The opportunity for inter-group comparisons creates a 
social competition to see one’s own group as better than an out-group 
(Turner, 1975). Thus, inter-group RPF could increase the value that team 
members have of team performance since individuals value to achieve 
favorable comparisons. Therefore, similar to others studies which found 
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that inter-group social comparison can mitigate motivation loss (Erev et 
al., 1993; Ouwerkerk & Ellemers, 2002; Worchel, Rothgerber, Day, Hart & 
Butemeyer, 1998), I propose that an inter-group RPF could reduce the 
negative effect of intra-group RPF on individual performance.  
To test my proposition, I conducted an experiment with a 2x2 design. The 
independent variables are the intra-group relative performance feedback 
(absent vs. present) and the inter-group relative performance feedback 
(absent vs. present). The dependent variable is the individual performance 
of team members. The results show that intra-group relative performance 
feedback has a negative effect on individual performance and that inter-
group relative performance feedback mitigates this negative effect. 
This study contributes to the management accounting research by 
extending our knowledge about how relative performance feedback 
influences how the people react to dysfunctional behaviors of their 
teammates. In addition, this study could have implications for 
practitioners by showing how the design of the information system can 
reduce dysfunctional behaviors in teams by aligning the individuals’ 
interest with the interest of the organization. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses development 
When individuals work in teams and they are rewarded based on group 
performance, the free rider problem can arise (Kerr, 1986; Rutte, 1990; 
Yamagishi, 1988). Numerous studies have focused on the antecedents of 
free riding behavior (Kidwell & Bennet, 1993; Rowe, 2004; Rowe et al., 
2008). However, significantly less research, both theoretical and empirical, 
has focused on the perceptions of free riding (Mulvey & Klein, 1998).  
The perception that one or various members of a group are contributing 
less to the group’s output than they could do, have significant implications 
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for team performance (Tata, 2002). In the psychological literature we can 
find two streams, which argue two opposite direction of team members’ 
behavior when they perceive that other team members are behaving as a 
free-rider.  
On the one hand, several studies argue that when individuals work in 
teams they may fear that others in the group will withhold effort and 
thereby benefit from the individuals' contributions (Jackson & Harkins, 
1985). Therefore, in order to avoid becoming a person who plays sucker 
roles, individuals attenuate their efforts (Erez & Somech, 1996; Kerr & 
Brunn, 1983; Kidwell & Bennet, 1993). Individuals who play a sucker role 
are persons who are easy to take advantage of them because they 
contribute to the group performance when nobody else does. Individuals 
are averse to sucker roles because the violation of some social norms like 
the equity norm, the reciprocity norm and the social responsibility norm 
make the sucker role uncomfortable (Kerr, 1983). Thus, when individuals 
perceived that other team members may free ride and take advantage on 
their contributions without any contribution from them, they may reduce 
their own contributions to the group in order to avoid to be exploited by 
other team members (Kerr, 1983; Schnake, 1991). 
On the other hand, contrary to sucker effect, several studies have stated 
that work motivation is enhanced when a group member realizes or 
anticipates that another group member is performing poorly (Wegge & 
Haslam, 2005). Karau & Williams (1997) and Williams & Karau (1991) 
found evidence that group members sometimes compensate for the 
deficiencies of other group member on a collective task in order to ensure 
group success (Wegge & Haslam, 2005). This effect is known as social 
compensation. The psychological literature has also found that the social 
compensation is more likely to happen when the group task is perceived 
as meaningful (Williams & Karau, 1991). Also if individuals are concerned 
about how the group's performance is evaluated (Wegge & Haslam, 2005). 
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It has been found that social compensation is higher in groups relatively 
small (Williams & Karau, 1991), groups with high cohesion (Karau & Hart, 
1998) and if group members identify themselves with other members of 
the group (Haslam, 2004; Haslam & Ellemers, 2005; van Knippenberg & 
Ellemers, 2003).  
In this study, I propose that the effect of the perception of free-riding 
behavior on performance depend on the information provided by the 
relative performance feedback. 
 
3.2.1. The effect of Inter-group RPF on individual performance 
An inter-group RPF provides information about the performance of 
different teams. People not only compare themselves with others, but also 
compare the group to which they belong with other groups (Goethals & 
Darley, 1987; Williams & Karau, 1991). An inter-group relative 
performance feedback can facilitate the comparison between groups and 
encourage higher effort of team members in order to maintain a positive 
self-image (Beach & Tesser, 1995; Tesser, 1988). The opportunity for 
inter-group comparisons creates a social competition to see one’s own 
group as better than out-group (Turner, 1975). In this vein, several studies 
have found that inter-group social comparisons can reduce or eliminate 
motivation loss (Erev et al., 1993; Ouwerkerk & Ellemers, 2002; Worchel 
et al., 1998). 
According to the social identity theory, people in inter-group situations 
have the desire to make favorable comparisons of one´s own group against 
other groups (Hogg, 2000; Lount & Phillips, 2007; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). I 
argue that inter-group relative performance feedback, since fosters inter-
group social comparisons, increases effort due to increased competition. 
People try hard to maintain positive self-concept, which can be reached by 
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attaining a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). One possibility 
to achieving such a positive identity is to discover that one’s group 
compares with other groups positively (Harkins & Szymanski, 1989). 
Thus, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Performance will be greater when inter-group RPF is present than when 
it is absent. 
 
3.2.2. The effect of Intra-group RPF moderated by Inter-group RPF 
An intra-group relative performance feedback provides information about 
all team members. This information may reveal shirking from some 
fellows and, as a result, create distrust between team members (Coletti, 
Sedatole & Towry, 2005). When the information provided to individuals 
reports that other team members withhold effort and they are rewarded 
by a group performance-based contract, individuals can feel fear that 
others benefit from the individuals' contributions (Jackson & Harkins, 
1985). As consequence, due to the strong aversion that people have 
against to be a sucker (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Schnake, 1991), individuals 
with high performance may reduce their own contributions to the group 
(Kerr, 1983; Schnake, 1991). Team members may experience inequity if 
they receive the same level of rewards as other members and they believe 
that members of the group withhold effort (Schnake, 1991). In order to 
restate the equity and to avoid being exploited by other team members, 
individuals may reduce their own effort. Therefore, I expect team 
members reduce their effort when an intra-group relative performance 
feedback is provided. 
I propose that the effect of intra-group relative performance feedback 
could be mitigated by providing an inter-group relative performance 
feedback. Williams & Karau (1991) found that individuals who perceived 
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that their fellows would free-ride on their contributions worked harder in 
order to compensate for other team members’ poor performance (social 
compensation effect). However, this only happened when the group 
performance was valued. The results from Williams & Karau (1991) study 
suggest that, although individuals may find it psychologically aversive, 
they will compensate a free-rider fellow whenever they value the group 
performance (Shepperd, 1993). An inter-group relative performance 
feedback may let the evaluation of the team performance because it 
facilitates the comparison between teams. It would increase the value 
associated with the group performance since people desire positive 
evaluation, especially in comparison with others (Williams & Karau, 
1991).  Individuals who experiment negative social identity will leave their 
group or will attempt to make it better (Goethals & Darley, 1987). A 
negative social identity could be experimented if one’s group compares 
unfavorably with other groups. Williams & Karau (1991) argued that one 
way to make the group better and, as a result, to achieve a positive 
identity, would be to work harder, that is, to compensate the fellows’ poor 
performance. 
Therefore, I propose that when an intra-group relative performance 
feedback reveals shirking from some team members, individuals will 
compensate their fellow's contributions whenever an inter-group relative 
performance feedback will be provided. In spite of the psychological costs 
that the information provided by an intra-group relative performance 
feedback would encourage, individuals will be more willing to compensate 
for loafing of other team members in order to achieve favorable 
comparisons with other groups. That is, the sucker effect produced in 
individuals by an intra-group RPF will affect less negatively on 
performance when information about other teams performance is 
provided. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
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H2: The relation between intra-group RPF and performance will be 
moderated by inter-group RPF, such that performance will be better when 
inter-group RPF is present rather than when it is absent. 
 
3.3. Research Method: Experimental design 
The hypotheses were tested by an experiment with a 2x2 design. The 
experiment was conducted among 90 students from Pablo de Olavide 
University in Seville (Spain). The choice of such subjects is due to the fact 
that to carry out the task did not need any specific knowledge or previous 
experience. The subjects participated in the experiment on a voluntary 
and anonymous way, and they gained real monetary rewards for their 
participation.  
The independent variables were intra-group relative performance 
feedback (present vs. absent) and inter-group relative performance 
feedback (present vs. absent). The dependent variable was the individual 
performance. 
 
3.3.1. Task Description 
I used Z-Tree software to program the experimental task (Fischbacher, 
2007). The task was based on Tafkov (2013) and it consisted in solving 
multiple choice multiplication problems for nine independent rounds. In 
each round, the subject received six multiplication problems. For each 
problem, five possible answers were provided, and just one was correct. 
I chose this task because it satisfies the three requirements for a strong 
relationship between comparison and competitive behavior. The first 
requirement is that the task must be similar across individuals to allow 
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comparison (Harkins & Jackson, 1985; Garcia & Tor, 2007). In the 
experiment, all subjects received the same multiplication problems and in 
the same order (Tafkov, 2013). The second one is that the comparison 
target must be similar on related attributes (Goethals & Darley, 1987; 
Garcia & Tor, 2007). This was satisfied due to the fact that all participants 
were recruited from a homogeneous pool (Tafkov, 2013). The third 
requirement is that the comparison domain must be important to the 
person (Pleban & Tesser, 1981; Tesser, 1991). In the experiment, subjects 
were told that solving the given multiplication problems accurately and 
quickly not only requires mechanical skills, but also general problem-
solving ability (Tafkov, 2013). 
 
3.3.2. Experimental procedure 
During the experiment, I conducted separated sessions for each condition. 
The procedures described in this section were the same for all conditions. 
When subjects arrived to the lab, they were placed in a different cubicle. 
They were able to see the experiment instructions on the screen computer. 
Also, the instructions were read aloud by the experimenter. The 
instructions informed to the subjects that they belonged to a team, which 
it was formed by three people. The subjects had as aim to reach the 
maximum group performance. The group performance was the addition of 
each one of the individual productions. 
The subjects were rewarded by a group performance-based contract. The 
team profit was equally divided between all team members, regardless of 
their contributions. The team profit was compassed by a fix and a variable 
reward. Specifically, each team received 1500 LECUS (Lab Experimental 
Currency Unit)1 only for their participation. In addition, they received 30 
                                                          
1
 The currency used in this experiment was a fictitious currency: LECUS. The total LECUS 
earned by a participant was converted to EUROS at the end of the experiment.    
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LECUS for each problem solved correctly (a). Also, I assumed that 
individuals are effort averse. To operationalize the concept of effort 
aversion, individuals who worked were charged with a production cost 
(Towry, 2003). Each member had a production cost (b), which was 
proportional to the problems solved correctly (10 LECUS). Thus, each 
subject was rewarded for one third of group profit minus the production 
cost of himself or herself (c).  
(a) Team profit =  1500+ 30 Σ xi 
(b) Production cost of member i = 10 xi 
(c) Individual profit =  (Team profit / 3) – 10 xi 
xi = production member  
Before the main task started, the subject had to answer a pre-experiment 
quiz, in order to know that they understood the instructions. After all 
participants answered all questions correctly, the task started. When 
participants finalized the task, they answered a post-experimental 
questionnaire in which participants had to answer demographic and 
process-related questions. 
 
3.3.3. Manipulation and measures of the variables 
The dependent variable was the individual performance of team members 
in the last six rounds. The individual performance was measured by the 
number of solved problems correctly for each individual for the last six 
rounds.  
The independent variables were the intra-group relative performance 
feedback and the inter-group relative performance feedback. The first one 
was manipulated by providing or not providing to the subjects, every three 
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rounds2, information about his or her own individual performance and the 
individual performance of each member of his or her group.  
On the other hand, in the case of an inter-group relative performance 
feedback was present, subjects received information about the 
performance of their own team as well as about the performance of the 
rest of the teams, which were participating in the session. In the case that 





3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 (7) reports the descriptive statistics for the variables 
performance and change in performance in the four experimental 
conditions. Figures 3.1 (2) and 3.2 (3) provide a graphical summary of 
these data.  Panel A of Table 3.1 (7) reports, for each condition, the mean 
performance for all 9 rounds, for the first three rounds, for the middle 
three rounds and for the last three rounds. These data show that 
individuals performed better when both RPF were present than when only 
intra-group RPF was present.  
The mean performance was marginally lower when inter-group RPF was 
absent than when it was present (t=-1.711, p-value= 0.091). The mean 
performance for all 9 rounds, as well as the mean performance for the first 
three rounds, for the middle three rounds and for the last three rounds 
differed when inter-group RPF was present and when it was not, 
whenever intra-group RPF was present (all 9 rounds: t=-2.641, p-
                                                          
2Following Tafkov (2013) and due to the low incremental information content of RPF 
after each round, RPF was  provided after every three rounds 
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value=0.011; first 3 rounds: t=-1.811 , p-value=0.077; middle 3 rounds: t=-
2.839 , p-value=0.007; last 3 rounds: t=-2.012 , p-value=0.05).  
 
TABLE 3.1 (7). Descriptive statistics 
PANEL A: PERFORMANCE  
 CONDITION 1: 
INTRA-GROUP 
RPF ABSENT / 
INTER-GROUP 
RPF ABSENT                          
n=21                                     
Mean (Std. Dev) 
CONDITION 2: 
INTRA-GROUP 
RPF PRESENT / 
INTER-GROUP 
RPF ABSENT                                   
n=24                                  
Mean (Std. Dev) 
CONDITION 3: 
INTRA-GROUP 
RPF ABSENT / 
INTER-GROUP 
RPF PRESENT                                  
n=21                                  
Mean (Std. Dev) 
CONDITION 4: 
INTRA-GROUP 
RPF PRESENT / 
INTER-GROUP 
RPF PRESENT                                   
n=24                                  
Mean (Std. Dev) 
Mean 
performance for 
all 9 rounds 
28.67 (10.63) 23.25 (11.43) 28.19 (11.93) 30.96 (8.96) 
Mean 
performance for 
first 3 rounds 
8.62 (3.23) 8.58 (3.90) 9.14 (3.70) 10.42 (3.06) 
Mean 
performance for 
middle 3 rounds 
9.38 (4.26) 7.54 (4.05) 8.52 (4.13) 10.71 (3.66) 
Mean 
performance for 
last 3 rounds 
10.67 (4.17) 7.13 (5.21) 10.52 (4.78) 9.83 (4.04) 
 
 
PANEL B: CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE 
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In addition, the mean performance for middle three rounds was 
marginally higher when intra-group RPF was present than when it was 
absent, whenever an inter-group RPF was present (t=-1.880, p-
value=0.067). However, the mean performance for these three rounds did 
not differ between these conditions when inter-group RPF was absent 
(t=1.483, p-value=0.145).  
The mean performance for the last three rounds was significantly lower 
when intra-group RPF was present than when it was absent (t=2.159, p-
value=0.034). However, this relationship was significant when inter-group 
RPF was absent (t=2.529, p-value=0.015). However, the relationship was 
not significant when inter-group RPF was present. The mean performance 
for the last three rounds did not differ when intra-group RPF was present 
and when it was absent, whenever inter-group RPF was present (t=0.525, 
p_=0.602). 
Panel B of Table 3.1 (7) shows changes in performance in each condition. 
The change in performance was defined as performance for the last three 
rounds minus performance for the first three rounds. Results showed that 
performance increased more when both RPF was absent. On the other 
hand, participants reduced more their performance when only intra-group 
RPF was present. 
Individuals reduced their performance significantly more when intra-
group RPF was present than when it was absent (t=3.406, p-value=0.001). 
Specifically, individuals reduced their performance when intra-group RPF 
was present and they increased it when it was absent. This happened 
when inter-group RPF was present and also when it was absent. However, 
when inter-group RPF was present the differences between the change in 
performance in intra-group RPF absent and present were only marginally 
significant (t=1.859, p-value=0.071). That is, the differences were more 
significant when inter-group RPF was absent (t=2.793, p-value=0.008) 
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than when it was present. In addition, individuals increased their 
performance significantly more when only inter-group RPF was present 
than when only intra-group RPF was present (t=-2.462, p-value=0.019). 
Specifically, individuals reduced their performance when only intra-group 
RPF was present and they increased it when only inter-group RPF was 
present. 
Altogether, the descriptive statistics suggest that inter-group RPF increase 
performance and that the effect of intra-group RPF on performance 
depends on if inter-group RPF is present or absent, which is consistent 
with my hypotheses. 
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3.4.2. Hypotheses Tests 
In order to test my hypotheses I used an ANCOVA, which allows 
contrasting the direct and interactive effects of two or more independent 
variables simultaneously. I ran a factorial model with the manipulated 
variables as fix factors, and performance in the last six rounds as 
dependent variable. In addition, I included as covariate the performance in 
the first three rounds in order to control the ability of subjects in the task.  
Results on Table 3.2 (8) show that there is a main effect of intra-group RPF 
(p-value=0.035), but there is not a main effect of inter-group RPF (p-
value=0.607). Results also show a marginally significant interaction effect 
of these two factors (p-value=0.068).  Furthermore, the results indicate 
that performance in the first three rounds has a significant effect on 
performance in the last six rounds. Therefore, my first hypothesis, which 
predicts that inter-group RPF will increase the performance, is not 








 First 3 rounds Middle 3
rounds
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significant interaction effect. The second hypothesis predicts that the 
effect of intra-group RPF will be mitigated if an inter-group RPF is present 
too. The results show that performance in the last six rounds is 
significantly lower when only intra-group RPF is present than when both 
RPF is present (t =6.526, p-value =0.014).  
 
TABLE 3.2 (8). ANCOVA. Effects on individual performance 
 
 Df F p-value 
Intercept 
 
1 6.881 0.010 
Performance in 
the first 3 rounds 
 
1 57.669 0.000 
Intra-group RPF 
 
1 4.573 0.035 
Inter-group RPF 
 
1 0.266 0.607 
Intra-group RPF * 
Inter-group RPF 
 
1 3.414 0.068 
Error 85   
 
 
The simple effects analysis (see Table 3.3 (9)) reveals that when inter-
group RPF is absent, individual performance is significantly lower when 
individuals received information about the performance of their fellow 
(intra-group RPF was present) (F=4.463, p-value=0.040). However, when 
inter-group RPF is present, there is not significant differences between 
when intra-group RPF is present and it is absent (F=0.424, p-value=0.519). 
These results indicate that the negative effect provoked by an intra-group 
RPF is mitigated when the information provided for this RPF is 
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complemented with other about the performance of the other teams. 
Therefore, these results support the second hypothesis.  
 
TABLE 3.3 (9). Simple effects analysis 
 
Source Df F Sig. 
Effect of Intra-group RPF 
when Inter-group RPF is 
absent 
 
1 4.463 0.040 
Effect of Intra-group RPF 
when Inter-group RPF is 
present 
 
1 0.424 0.519 
 
 
3.4.3. Supplemental Analysis 
A) Contrast coding 
In order to extend the analysis of my results I complement the 
conventional ANOVA with a contrast coding in order to test whether there 
is any condition different from the other conditions. ANOVA indicates 
whether cell means are different from one another, but it does not specify 
the source of differences among means (Buckless & Ravenscroft, 1990). 
Buckless & Ravenscroft (1990) proposed that researchers should use 
contrast coding instead of conventional ANOVA when means involve 
nonsymmetrical patterns such that the effect is due to the difference of 
one experimental cell from the other three cells, which are approximately 
equal.   
 
CHAPTER 3:  
Intra-group vs. Inter-group Relative Performance Feedback 
73 
 





TABLE 3.4 (10). Contrast test 
 T P-value 
 




Figure 3.3 (4) shows a pattern that we can identify with the pattern 
described by Buckless & Ravenscroft (1990). Only when inter-group RPF 
is absent and intra-group RPF is present, the performance of the last six 
rounds appears different from the other conditions. Thus, in order to test 
whether the subjects performed less when only they received information 
about other members of their group than in other conditions I carried out 
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group RPF present and inter-group RPF absent condition and +1 for the 
other three conditions (intra-group RPF absent and inter-group RPF 
absent; intra-group RPF absent and inter-group RPF present; intra-group 
RPF present and inter-group RPF present). The results of this analysis are 
shown in Table 3.4 (10). These results show that subjects perform 
significantly less when only information about other members of their 
group is provided than in another condition analyzed in this study 
(t=2.694, p-value=0.008).  
 
B) Tests of Causal Model  
I used Partial Least Square (PLS) technique in order to establish that the 
H1 and H2 results are due to the process described by my theory. My 
theory states that an inter-group RPF will have a positive effect on 
individual performance. Also, it states that when individuals perceive or 
know that their teammates are behaving as free-rider, they could feel that 
they are played a sucker role. I propose that the effect of this feeling on 
individual performance will depend on the presence of an inter-group. I 
measured the sucker role feeling by several indicators, thus PLS is 
suitable, since it is used for the estimation of models involving latent 
constructs measured by this way (Naranjo-Gil, 2009). PLS focuses on 
explaining variances of dependent variables and it is similar to ordinary 
squares regression with regard to output and assumptions (Naranjo-Gil, 
2009). 
Figure 3.4 (5) and Table 3.5 (11) show the path coefficients in the 
structural model and the significance of the standardized βs, based on 
bootstrapping procedure (Naranjo-Gil, 2009). 
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*** Significant at 0.001 





TABLE 3.5 (11). Path coefficients 
 
 Sucker effect Performance 
Three first rounds  0.604 
Inter-group RPF  -0.165 
Intra-group RPF 0.309  





















FIGURE 3.4 (5). Causal Model 
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The dependent variable was performance, which was measured by the 
number of problems solved correctly in the last six rounds. In a similar 
way that in the test of hypotheses, I controlled the ability of participants 
by the numbers of problems solved correctly in the first three rounds. 
To measure sucker effect, subjects indicated their agreement with five 
items using a five-point Likert scale (these items are provided in Appendix 
3.1). In order to assess the validity of the measurement I used a reliability 
and factorial analysis (Table 3.6 (12)), in addition to PLS technique. 
 
TABLE 3.6(12). Factorial analysis I 
 
 Item1 Item2 Item3 Item4 Item5 
Commonality 0.413 0.546 0.760 0.592 0.786 
Cronbach Alpha 0.839 
Explained variance 61.95% 
 
 
These analyses showed a high value of Cronbach’s Alpha (0.839) and also 
of the explained variance (61.95%). However, I found an item with a low 
value of commonality (Item 1=0.413), which suggest that should be 
suitable to eliminate this item. The results of PLS technique suggestted 
eliminating this item too, because its loading was lower than 0.7 (0.570). I 
repeated the process without Item1. The results are shown in the Table 
3.7 (13). Cronbach’s Alpha was 0.848 and it was explained 69.39% of the 
variance.  
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TABLE 3.7 (13). Factorial analysis II 
 
 Item2 Item3 Item4 Item5 
Commonality 0.560 0.804 0.568 0.844 
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.848 
Explained variance 69.39% 
 
 
Furthermore, I assessed for discriminant validity of the measurement 
model by calculating the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and by 
comparing this with the squared correlation between constructs (Naranjo-
Gil, 2009). Discriminant validity was satisfactory because the AVE’s were 
higher than the correlations (Naranjo-Gil, 2009).  
The model confirms that individuals showed a sucker effect in higher 
extent when intra-group RPF was present (Link 1: t=3.366, p-
value<0.001). This higher sucker effect, as I predicted, had as 
consequences a lower individual performance (Link2: t=3.408, p-
value<0.001). However, this negative effect was marginally moderated by 
inter-group RPF (Link 4: 1.376, p-value<0.1). On the other hand, results 
did not show a relationship between inter-group RPF and performance. In 
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C) Explanation for unsupported hypothesis 
Both economic and psychology theories suggest that the effect of RPF 
depends on how feedback affects perceptions of individuals’ relative 
position (Hannan et al., 2008). When individuals perceive goals as 
unattainable, they do not try to meet them (Locke & Latham, 1990), 
resulting in lower performance (Hannan et al., 2008). Then, the effect of 
inter-group RPF could depend on the likelihood of individuals to attain 
their goals, in this case, to achieve a favorable comparison relative to other 
teams. Therefore, in this section I analyze the effect of inter-group RPF, but 
controlling the difference between the teams’ performance. 
In order to test this effect, I calculated the difference between each team 
performance and the performance of the team that was in the first place: 
distance 1 (difference in the three first rounds), distance 2 (difference in 
the middle three rounds) and distance 3 (difference in the first six 
rounds). I ran a factorial model in which the fix factor was inter-group RPF 
variable and the dependent variable was performance in the last six 
rounds. In addition, I included the three news calculated variables as 
covariate. Table 3.8 (14) shows the results. Results showed that inter-
group RPF had a significant effect on performance, such as the 
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TABLE 3.8 (14). Effect of inter-group RPF on individual performance 
 
 Df F p-value 
Intercept 
 
1 282.796 0.000 
Distance 1 
 
1 4.691 0.033 
Distance 2 
 
1 1.925 0.169 
Distance 3 
 
1 4.366 0.040 
Inter-group RPF 
 
1 4.669 0.034 
Error 85   
 
 
In order to complement these results, I analyzed the effect of inter-group 
RPF every time participants received the information. That is, I analyzed 
the effect of inter-group PRF on individual performance in the next three 
rounds, taking into account the distance between the teams’ performance. 
Tables 3.9 (15) and 3.10 (16) show the results. 
 
TABLE 3.9 (15). Effect of inter-group RPF on individual performance 
in the middle 3 rounds 
 Df F p-value 
Intercept 
 
1 264.395 0.000 
Distance 1 
 
1 14.645 0.000 
Inter-group RPF 
 
1 9.586 0.003 
Error 87   
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TABLE 3.10 (16). Effect of inter-group RPF on individual performance 
in the last 3 rounds 
PANEL A: Controlling for the distance on performance in the middle 3 rounds 
 Df F p-value 
Intercept 
 
1 277.437 0.000 
Distance 2 
 
1 26.180 0.000 
Inter-group RPF 
 
1 2.399 0.125 
Error 87   
 
 
PANEL B: Controlling for the distance on performance in the first 6 rounds 
 Df F p-value 
Intercept 
 
1 233.825 0.000 
Distance 3 
 
1 19.213 0.000 
Inter-group RPF 
 
1 6.760 0.011 
Error 87   
 
 
When the distance on performance in the first three rounds was included 
as covariate, results showed a positive significant effect of inter-group RPF 
in the performance over the following three rounds. On the other hand, the 
effect of inter-group on performance of the last three rounds was 
significant when it was controlled the distance on performance in the first 
six rounds. 
Altogether, these results could suggest an explanation about why I did not 
find a direct effect of inter-group RPF. Although inter-group comparison 
could encourage a positive effect on performance, it may have been 
CHAPTER 3:  
Intra-group vs. Inter-group Relative Performance Feedback 
81 
 
compensated by the negative effect that inter-group RPF could have in 
individuals who perceive to meet their goals as unattainable. 
 
3.5. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this study, I tried to extend our knowledge about how the design of 
management information can affect to dysfunctional behaviors. 
Specifically, this study analyzed how relative performance feedback can 
influence people reaction to dysfunctional behaviors of their teammates. 
Results from this study can help accountants to understand the role of 
feedback in improving performance.  
When individuals perceive that other team members are behaving as a 
free-rider, they would reduce their effort. This happens because 
individuals may fear that other team members take advantage from their 
contributions.  However, psychology researchers (Wegge & Haslam, 2005; 
Williams & Karau, 1991) found that there are some circumstances under 
which individuals would increase their effort when they perceive or know 
that other team members perform insufficiently (social compensation). 
Two factors are necessary for social compensation occurs. First, 
individuals must perceive that their team members are performing 
insufficiently. This information could be provided by an intra-group RPF, 
which reports information about the team members’ performance. 
However, this is not sufficient to produce the social compensation effect. 
In addition, it is also necessary that individuals value the team 
performance. An inter-group RPF facilitates comparison between teams. 
Then, since individuals’ value achieve favorable comparisons; inter-group 
RPF could increase the value of team performance for individuals. 
Results from this study show that when both intra-group and inter-group 
RPF are present, the performance is higher than when only intra-group 
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RPF is present. This is consistent with my predictions based on that when 
intra-group and inter-group RPF are present, both factors which foster the 
social compensation effect are met. However, I did not find an increment 
in performance when both RPF are present, but a reduction in 
performance. Thus, my results show that when an inter-group is present, 
the negative effect that intra-group RPF produce in individual 
performance is mitigated. The desire of individuals to obtain favorable 
comparisons reduces the decline in performance that happens when 
individuals know the performance of their peers. That is, the presence of 
inter-group RPF mitigates the sucker effect which appears when intra-
group RPF is present. 
On the other hand, I found an unexpected result, inter-group RPF did not 
influence significantly on performance. An explanation for this result could 
be that the positive effect of inter-group RPF on performance could have 
been compensated by the negative effect that this feedback had in 
individuals who perceived that their goals were unattainable. In this vein, 
further research could be needed to extend our knowledge about how 
inter-group RPF affect performance. 
The results of this study have also practical implications for organizations, 
which can motivate individuals when they work in teams by a suitable 
design of accounting information systems. This study can help 
organizations to lessen the negative impact that the sucker effect may 
have in organizational structures based on teams. At the same time, this 
study has several limitations such as the generalizability to real-world 
setting due to the methodology used. However, I do not expect that 
employees in organizations respond differently to my experimental 
manipulations, but they face other variables that may influence in their 
behaviors.  
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Appendix 3.1. Sucker effect questionnaire 
I adapt the instrument of Mulvey & Klein (1998). Subjects indicated their 
agreement with these items using a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 
(nothing) to 5 (totally). 
1. Because other group members are not contributing as much as they 
could I was not trying my best on this activity. 
2. Because other group members are putting in less effort than they are 
able, I did not plan to continue to work hard on the activity. 
3. Others in my group are not trying their best on this activity, so I was 
not trying my best either. 
4. Because other group members are not trying as hard as they could, I 
was not working as hard as I could on this activity. 
5. Because other group members are not trying as hard as they can, I 
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Unethical behaviors by employees may be difficult to control in 
organizations (Tannenbaum, 1968), since there are situations in which 
direct supervision cannot be possible (Trevino & Victor, 1992). Co-
workers often acquire information about other agents that is not directly 
available to the principal (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Thus, they will be more 
likely than supervisors to be aware of unethical and opportunistic 
behaviors (Trevino & Victor, 1992; Zhang, 2008). Co-workers will play an 
important role in order to detect misconducts in organizations, such as 
fraud (Nitsch, Baetz & Hughes, 2005). In this vein, management should 
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encourage employees to report unethical behavior internally (Mayer, 
Nurmohamed, Trevino, Shapiro & Schminke, 2013). Thus, it is important 
to analyze the factors that increase the likelihood that employees will 
report such behaviors internally (Mayer et al., 2013). In this study, I 
examine how the perceived fairness and inter-group RPF influence the 
peer reporting decision. Specifically, I analyze if individuals will be more 
willing to report peers’ overstatement when they perceive their 
supervisor as fair rather than unfair, even though they are not rewarded 
for doing so. Furthermore, I analyze if this relationship depends on 
whether an inter-group RPF is present or not. 
Individuals are not always willing to report peers’ misconduct behaviors. 
Reporting on peers’ misconduct behavior is an act that arouses diverse 
and conflicting opinion (Reuben & Stephenson, 2012). In the management 
literature we can find studies which show that individuals are willing to 
punish peers when they behave opportunistically (see Fehr & Gächter, 
2000). Some motivations for reporting peer’s overstatements could be the 
indignation feelings at observing lies (Reuben & Stephenson, 2012), dislike 
for disadvantageous inequality (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999), or the competitive preferences (Fershman & Weiss, 1998; Frank, 
1985). On the other hand, research on whistleblowing effects  has found 
that employees are generally reluctant to report such misconducts 
(Robertson, Stefaniak & Curtis, 2011) because they fear retaliation for 
reporting or believe such effort will be ineffective (Mayer et al., 2013; 
Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). In addition, some groups may 
oppose it for several reasons, such as: (a) because violates a moral 
obligational loyalty to the group and professional norms of autonomy and 
self-regulation (Graham, 1986; Swazey & Scher, 1981); (b) because 
members benefit from engaging in, or overlooking wrongdoing (Near & 
Miceli, 1985); and (c) because that exposure of wrongdoing may lead to 
lose their jobs (Greenberg, Miceli & Cohen, 1987).  
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From a economic point of view, peer reporting could be encouraged by 
monetary incentives (Miceli, Near & Dworkin, 2009). If individuals are 
rewarded based on their peer’s reporting, a wealth-maximizing individual 
will always prefer to blow the whistle on a misconducting peer (Zhang, 
2008). On the other hand, when individuals are not rewarded based on 
their peer’ reporting, economic theories predict that individuals never 
report on others because they are indifferent (Reuben & Stephenson, 
2012). However, individuals are not only motivated by monetary 
incentives. Numerous studies have shown that individuals are also 
motivated by reciprocity (Hannan, 2005) and social comparisons (Luft & 
Shields, 2009). In this vein, this study analyzes how reciprocity and social 
comparison affect peer reporting decision when individuals are not 
rewarded for reporting peers misconduct. 
Reciprocity theory states that individuals are willing to reward kind 
actions and punish unkind actions even though they incur a cost to do so 
(Hannan, 2005). Zhang (2008) analyzed how individuals’ fairness 
perception of the principal affects the willingness to report others when 
individuals are rewarded by a peer reporting system (it provides a 
monetary reward for truthful whistleblowing). According to reciprocity 
theory, she argues that individuals will be less willing to blow the whistle 
when they perceive the principal as unfair rather than fair. The reason for 
that is that individuals who feel exploited by the supervisor are more 
likely to conduct similar acts as a mechanism to correct perceptions of 
inequity (Hollinger & Clark, 1983). In this study I try to extend Zhang’s 
(2008) research by analyzing the effect of individuals’ fairness perception 
of the principal on whistleblowing decisions when individuals are not 
rewarded for doing so. Specifically, I propose that individuals report peers’ 
overstatement more likely when they perceived that have been treated 
fairly by their supervisor rather than unfairly, even when they do not 
receive any reward for peer reporting. 
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On the other hand, individuals may be motivated by social comparisons 
too (Luft & Shields, 2009). An inter-group RPF facilitates the social 
comparison between teams. In inter-group situations, individuals have the 
desire to make favorable comparisons of one’s own group against other 
out-groups (Hogg, 2000; Lount & Phillips, 2007; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In 
this vein, several studies have found that inter-group social comparison 
can eliminate motivation loss (Erev, Bornstein & Galili, 1993; Harkins and 
Szymanski, 1989; Ouwerkerk & Ellemers, 2002; Worchel, Rothgerger, Day, 
Hart & Butemeyer, 1998). However, the peer’s overstatement can increase 
the possibility to achieve favorable comparisons. Thus, I propose that, in 
order to try to obtain a positive comparison relative to other teams, 
individuals report peers’ overstatement less likely when an inter-group 
RPF is present than when it is absent. In addition, I propose that the 
presence of an inter-group PRF will decrease the effect of individuals’ 
perceive fairness on whistleblowing decision.  When an inter-group RPF is 
present, individuals will be more focus on his relationship with the other 
teams rather than how they are treated by their supervisor (Kelly & Tan, 
2010). 
I tested my expectations in an experiment among 105 graduate students. I 
analyzed the actual peer reporting rather than the intentions to report. 
The meta-analysis of whistleblowing studies carried out by Mesmer-
Magnus & Viswesvaran (2005) showed that the predictors of 
whistleblowing intentions are not necessarily the same as the predictors 
of actual whistleblowing (Miceli et al., 2009). Thus, I try to cover a 
research limitation on whistleblowing behavior, where authors measured 
the intention to blow the whistle rather than the actual whistleblowing 
(Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2009). 
In this experiment, a team member was given the opportunity to lie by 
overstating their results in order to receive a higher payoff and another 
team member observed the behavior of his/her teammate. Those 
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individuals who observed overstating had the opportunity to report 
others. Individuals who were reported for overstating their results were 
sanctioned. However, individuals who report other did not receive any 
monetary reward from their action (Reuben & Stephenson, 2012). In this 
experiment, the independent variables were the individuals’ fairness 
perception of the principal (low vs. high) and the inter-group PRF (present 
vs. absent). 
Contrary my expectations, I did not find a significant effect of individuals’ 
fairness perception of the principal on peer reporting decision. On the 
other hand, according to my expectations, the experimental results 
showed that individuals reported peer’s overstatements in a lower extent 
when an inter-group RPF was present. Also, they showed that when 
individuals perceive their supervisor as fair, they will be more likely to 
behave in a reciprocal way, when inter-group RPF is absent rather than 
present. This result suggests that the peer reporting decision will be more 
driven by inter-group competition rather than reciprocity.   
This study contributes to management accounting research by extending 
our knowledge about how different control systems influence employees’ 
decisions about whether report internally or not unethical behaviors. In 
organizations, control systems are implemented together other control 
systems and organizational practices, thus examining the interactive effect 
of different control systems and organizational practices is an important 
issue to firms (Kelly & Tan, 2010). In this vein, this study analyzed the 
interactive effect of individuals’ fairness perception and inter-group RPF. 
In addition, unlike Zhang’s (2008) study I focused on a setting in which 
employees did not receive a monetary reward for whistleblowing because 
this is not common in practice (Towry, 2003). On the other hand, previous 
accounting literature has focused on how relative performance feedback 
influence on performance (Hannan, Krishnan & Newman, 2008; Hannan, 
McPhee, Newman & Tafkov, 2013; Murthy & Schafer, 2011; Tafkov, 2013). 
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However, I try to show that not only it is important to analyze the effect of 
providing relative information on performance, but also to understand 
how this information could affect to other individual behaviors. 
 
4.2. Hypotheses development 
 
4.2.1. Effect of individual’s fairness perception on whistleblowing 
decision 
The individuals’ fairness perception of the principal is an important 
determinant in the individuals’ willingness to blow the whistle (Miceli, 
Near & Schwenk, 1991; Zhang, 2008). Employees who perceive that they 
are treated fairly by their employer are more likely to frame the 
relationship as based upon mutual social exchange, advancing behaviors 
intended to benefit the organization, such as whistleblowing (Seifert, 
Sweeney, Joireman & Thornton, 2010). They could believe that they owe 
something in return to the supervisor, and as a consequence they are 
motivated to engage in an extra-role behavior which benefits their 
supervisors (Trevino & Weaver, 2001). Thus, peer reporting could be seen 
as a behavioral response to the perception of fairness since it may be 
considered an additional task for the employee to help the management 
(Douhou, Magnus & Van Soest, 2012; Victor, Trevino & Shapiro, 1993). 
This response to the perception of fairness can be explained by the 
reciprocity theory. 
Reciprocity theory states that people want to be nice to those who treat 
them fairly and want to punish those who hurt them (Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999; Rabin, 1993). People engage in reciprocity even in the absence of 
any expectation of future interactions or material benefits because they 
have a social preference for being treated kindly (Hannan, 2005). Thus, 
people reward kind intentions and punish unkind intentions, even though 
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it may be a cost to do so (Hannan, 2005). In this vein, Kelly & Tan (2010) 
and Hannan (2005) argue and find that employees who receive a larger 
profit-sharing or a higher wage from their firm would reciprocate with 
behaviors that benefit their firm even when those behaviors are not 
extrinsically rewarded or contractually enforceable. 
Therefore, based on reciprocity theory, if employees perceive that they are 
being treated fairly, they should be more willing to benefit their 
organizations by engaging in extra-role behaviors (Seifert et al., 2010; 
Trevino & Weaver, 2001). Thus, when a team member overstates his 
result which has negative consequences for the organization, the 
teammates will be more willing to blow the whistle in order to help the 
organization when they perceive their supervisor as fair rather than 
unfair. That is, I propose a positive relationship between individual’s 
perceive fairness of the principal and the likelihood that individuals report 
peers’ overstatement.  
H1: Individuals will be more likely to report peers’ overstatement when 
individuals perceive their supervisor as fair rather than unfair. 
 
4.2.2. Direct and moderated effect of inter-group RPF on 
whistleblowing decision 
Economic theories assume that people compete for monetary rewards, 
however social comparison theory argues that people also compete for 
non-monetary rewards (Greenberg, Ashton-James & Ashkanasy, 2007; 
Smith, 2000). In addition, social comparisons not only occur between 
individuals but also between teams (Munkes & Diehl, 2003), since people 
not only compare themselves with others, but also compare the group to 
which they belong with other groups (Goethals & Darley, 1987; Williams & 
Karau, 1991).  
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Inter-group settings encourage higher levels of competition (Lount & 
Phillips, 2007). The opportunity for inter-group comparison creates a 
“social competition” to see one’s own group as better than an out-group 
(Turner, 1975; Lount & Phillips, 2007). That is, when inter-group 
comparison is possible, people have the desire to make favorable 
comparisons of one’s group against other groups (Hogg, 2000; Lount & 
Phillips, 2007; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). An inter-group RPF provides 
information about the performance of different teams. This information 
facilitates inter-group comparisons since it allows individuals compare 
their own group performance to other groups. Thus, an inter-group RPF 
could encourage social competition among teams.  
Several studies have found that inter-group settings can reduce the lack of 
motivation (Erev et al., 1993; Ouwerkerk & Ellemers, 2002; Worchel et al., 
1998), since it encourages higher effort of team members in order to 
maintain a positive self-image (Beach & Tesser, 1995; Tesser, 1988) and  
promotes within-group collaborations (Baer, Leenders, Oldham & Vadera, 
2010; Burton-Chellew, Ross-Gillespie & West, 2010). However, when a 
team member overstates his/her results, the likelihood to obtain favorable 
comparison relative to other teams increases. Thus, the higher within-
group collaboration that inter-group competition encourages could 
motivate team members to cover their teammates. Therefore, in order to 
try to obtain a better position compared to other groups (Munkes & Diehl, 
2003), I expect that individuals will be less willing to report peers’ 
overstatement when an inter-group RPF is present than when it is absent. 
Thus, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: Individuals will be less likely to report peers’ overstatement when inter-
group RPF is present rather than absent. 
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Finally, I consider whether the inter-group RPF could moderate the 
relationship between individual’s fairness perception of the principal and 
whistleblowing decision. Based on Kelly & Tan (2010), I expect that 
introducing a feedback system that reports the teams’ performance may 
increase the focus of individuals on the relationship of their group with 
other groups and shift their focus away from how they perceive their 
supervisor. Thus, when an inter-group RPF is present, the whistleblowing 
decision would be driven by the inter-group competition rather than the 
individual’s fairness perception of the principal. That is, when individuals 
perceive their supervisor as fair, I expect that they will be more willing to 
report peers’ overstatements when inter-group RPF is absent that when it 
is present.  
H3: Inter-group RPF will reduce the positive relationship between 
individuals’ fairness perception and the likelihood of reporting peers’ 
overstatement.  
 
4.3. Research Method: Experimental design 
In order to test my hypotheses I used an experiment in which participated 
105 graduate students from Pablo de Olavide University. The choice of 
such participants is due to the fact that it was not needed any specific 
knowledge or previous experience to carry out the task. Students 
participated in the experiment on a voluntary and anonymous way, and 
they gained real monetary rewards for their participation. 
 
4.3.1. Experiment design and task description 
In this experiment, the participants worked in groups of three people, in 
which one participant played the role of supervisor and the other two ones 
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played the role of employee. These groups were formed randomly by the 
computer. Each session of this experiment consisted in eight periods. In 
each period each individual was matched with two new participants 
(Zhang, 2008). Participants were not repeatedly matched to avoid 
extraneous variables as explanations for the employees’ behaviors (Zhang, 
2008). The subject could not know the identity of the participants who 
formed their teams.  
I used Z-Tree Software to program the task of this experiment 
(Fischbacher, 2007). The task that participants had to carry out depended 
on the role that they played. Although, there were two employees in the 
team, only one (Employee A) performed the task. The task was based on 
Gill and Prowse (2012), and it consisted of a screen with 48 sliders. Each 
slider was initially positioned at 0 and could be moved as far as 100. The 
team received a point for each slider that Employee A positioned exactly 
50. They were allotted 2 minutes per period. In each period, after 
Employee A finalized the task, they received information about their 
results and then, they had to communicate how many points they had 
obtained. On the other hand, Employee B observed both the actual result 
obtained by Employee A as his/her reported result in each period. If 
employee A overstated his/her results, Employee B had the opportunity to 
ask that the Employee A will be revised. Finally, the task of the Supervisor 
was to choose which the employee B’s reward was. Employee B knew 
which his/her wage was before to decide whether report or not peer’s 
overstatement.  
The reward of Employee A depended on the number of points that he/she 
had reported. The employees A was informed that the computer did not 
check whether the reported points matched the actual points that he/she 
obtained. The computer only checked this when Employee B decided that 
Employee A had to be revised. In the case that Employee B decided that 
Employee A had to be revised, Employee A’s reward depended on the 
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actual points that he/she obtained and not on the reported points, and 
he/she was fined. Specifically, the reward of Employee A was: 




The reward of Employee B was chosen by the Supervisor. That is, the 
reward of Employee B was fixed, it did not depend on his/her 
whistleblowing decision. The Supervisor chose a wage for Employee B 
which ranged between 650 LECUS and 1450 LECUS and Employee B knew 
it.  
Finally, the Supervisor reward was determined by the results of the 
Employee A and the wages of both employees. Specifically, the reward of 
the Supervisor was: 
Supervisor’s reward = 3050 LECUS + 15 x Actual points – Wage B – 
Employee A’s reward; 
 
4.3.2. Variable Manipulation and measurement 
The dependent variable of this study was the whistleblowing decision. I 
measured this variable in two ways. On one hand, I measured this variable 
as a dummy variable, which indicates whether the participant blew the 
whistle or not (Reuben & Stephenson, 2012).  On the other hand, similar to 
Towry (2003) and Zhang (2008), I measured the dependent variable as 
                                                          
3
 LECUS is the fictitious currency which was used in this experiment. At the end of the 
experiment, the total LECUS obtained was converted to EUROS (160 LECUS = 1 EURO). 
10 x Reported points,   if Employee B decided not to blow the whistle 
10 x Actual points – 800,     if Employee B decided to blow the whistle 
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the percentage of whistleblowing (the number of times that the 
participant decided to blow the whistle divided by that the number of 
times that the participant had a teammate who overstated his/her 
results).  
The independent variables of this experiment were the fairness perception 
and the inter-group RPF. The first one was measured by the wage that the 
principal chose to pay to agents in each period and by a question which 
was included in the post-experimental questionnaire (QB6: Under which 
value do you consider your wage chosen by your supervisor as low?). When 
the principal has the option of choosing a low or a high wage, a principal 
that chooses a high wage can be seen as giving a gift to the agents (the 
principal reduces its own wealth by giving a higher wage when it does not 
have to do) (Zhang, 2008). Thus, this action should be perceived as fairer 
than the selection of a low wage, since theories of social justice suggest 
that feelings of unfairness will arise if people perceive that they receive 
lower outcomes than others or lower outcomes that they expected 
(Grienberger, Rutte & Van Knippenberg, 1997). I considered that the wage 
was low when it was lower than the value that they answered in the 
question QB6 (WAGE<QB6) and high when it was higher (WAGE>=QB6). 
On the other hand, inter-group RPF was manipulated by providing or not 
to the participants information about the performance of their own team 
as well as about the performance of the rest of the teams in the session. In 
the case that inter-group RPF was absent, they did not receive information 
about other teams’ performance. 
 
4.4. Results 
In order to check if the chosen wage affected participants’ fairness 
perception of the supervisor, I included two questions in the post-
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experimental questionnaire. Employees B were asked how fair their 
supervisor was when they chose a low (high) wage. Results showed that 
the participants’ fairness perception was affected by the chosen wage. 
Participants considered fairer their supervisor when they provided them a 
high wage than when provided a low wage (t=-5.963, p-value<0.001). 
When inter-group RPF was absent, the mean fairness rating for the 
supervisor was significantly lower when the supervisor chose a low wage 
(1.95) than when chose a high wage (3.53) (t=-4.187, p-value<0.01). When 
inter-group RPF was present, I found the same result, the mean fairness 
rating for the supervisor was significantly lower when the supervisor 
chose a low wage (2.25) than when chose a high wage (3.69) (t=-4.213, p-
value<0.01). Therefore, the wage chosen by the supervisor compared with 
the wage under which individuals consider as low wage was used as a 
measure of the participants’ fairness perception of the supervisor. 
Specifically, I considered that the fairness perception was low when 
individuals received a low wage and high when they received a high wage. 
 
4.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
In this experiment participated 105 subjects which repeated the same task 
during eight periods. Of these participants, 35 played the role of Employee 
B. They were the participants who had the opportunity to report peers’ 
overstatements. However, Employee B only had this opportunity when the 
other employee of his/her group had overstated his/her result. Thus, I 
focused only on the observations in which the Employee A (who had the 
possibility to overstate his/her result) overstated his/her result. 
Employees B had the opportunity to blow the whistle 83 times. 
Table 4.1 (17) reports the descriptive statistics for the mean wage, the 
number of times that was chosen a low (high) wage by the Supervisor, the 
number of times that Employees A overstated their results and the 
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whistleblowing decision. Figure 4.1 (6) shows a graphical summary of the 
whistleblowing decision. 
 
TABLE 4.1 (17). Descriptive Statistics 
 















































































The mean wage chosen by the supervisors was 853.45 LECUS 
(SD=223.34). Specifically, when inter-group RPF was absent (present) the 
mean wage was 854.66 (852.08). There is not significant differences in the 
mean wage chosen by the supervisor when an inter-group RPF was 
present or absent (F=0.003, p-value>0.1). In addition, these differences are 
not significant regardless supervisor chose a high (F=0.004, p-value>0.1) 
or a low wage (F=0.547, p-value>0.1). Also, I did not find significant 
differences in the wages between the periods (F=0.708, p-value>0.1). 
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The descriptive statistics showed that the percentage of whistleblowing 
was higher when supervisor chose a high wage than a low wage, which is 
consistent with my first hypothesis. However, this happened only when 
inter-group RPF was absent. That is, this descriptive statistics showed that 
the effect of fairness perception depends on whether an inter-group RPF 
was present or not, such as I proposed in the third hypothesis. Consistent 
with my second hypothesis, the percentage of whistleblowing was higher 
when an inter-group RPF was absent than when it was present.  
 
4.4.2. Hypotheses test 
In order to test my hypotheses about the influence of perceived fairness 
and inter-group RPF on whistleblowing decisions, I carried out two 
different analyses. One in which the dependent variable was a dummy 
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overstating the results in period z (A). And another one in which the 
dependent variable was the percentage of whistleblowing (B).   
 
A) Whistleblowing decision as a dummy variable 
In order to examine the effect of perceived fairness and inter-group on 
whistleblowing decision I ran a logit regression. The dependent variable 
indicated if individuals reported their peers for overstating their results 
(dummy variable). As independent variable I used: i) fairness perception: 
a dummy variable equal to one if the supervisor chose a high wage and 
zero when chose a low wage; ii) inter-group RPF: a dummy variable equal 
to one when inter-group RPF is present; and iii) an interaction term 
between i) and ii). 
Results on Table 4.2 (18) show that there is a marginally significant effect 
of inter-group RPF (p-value=0.077), but there is not a main effect of 
fairness perception (p-value=0.793). Also, they show a marginally 
significant interaction effect of these two variables (p-value=0.081). These 
results do not support the first hypothesis, which predicts that fairness 
perception influence positively on whistleblowing decision. On the other 
hand, the hypothesis 2, which predicts that individuals blow the whistle in 
lower extent when inter-group RPF is present, is supported. In addition, as 
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TABLE 4.2 (18). LOGIT REGRESSION. Effects on whistleblowing 
decisions 
 








0.124 0.474 0.069 1 0.793 1.132 
 
Inter-group RPF * 
Perceived Fairness 
 
-1.651 0.947 3.039 1 0.081 0.192 
Constant 
 
-0.019 0.237 0.006 1 0.938 0.982 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the positive effect of perceived fairness on 
whistleblowing decision is mitigated when an inter-group RPF is present. 
The simple effects analysis shows that when supervisor choose a high 
wage, individuals decide to blow the whistle in a significant higher extent 
when inter-group RPF is absent than when it is present (p-value=0.028). I 
argued that when inter-group RPF is present individuals focus more on 
comparing   their group   with other groups than on how they are treated 
by the supervisor. In this vein, I expected that when individuals perceive 
that they are being treated fairly by their supervisor, they responded in a 
reciprocal way when inter-group RPF was absent, but not when it was 
present. Results showed that when individuals perceived their supervisor 
as fair, they were less willing to blow the whistle when inter-group RPF 
was present than when it was absent. The simple effects are shown in the 
Table 4.3 (19). 
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TABLE 4.3 (19). Simple effects 
 
 β S.E. Wald df p-value Exp(β) 
 
Effect of perceived fairness 
when inter-group RPF is 
absent 
 
-0.950 0.657 2.089 1 0.148 0.387 
Effect of perceived fairness 
when inter-group RPF is 
present 
 
0.701 0.682 1.058 1 0.304 2.017 
Effect of inter-group RPF 
when perceived fairness is 
low 
 
0.013 0.568 0.001 1 0.982 1.013 
Effect of inter-group RPF 
when perceived fairness is 
high 
 




B) Whistleblowing decision as the percentage of whistleblowing 
In this analysis whistleblowing decision was measured as the percentage 
of whistleblowing (Towry, 2003; Zhang, 2008). Following Zhang (2008), I 
selected the Employees B who had overstating teammates both when they 
received a low wage and when they received a high wage (19 
participants). I calculated two whistleblowing percentages for each of 
them: one for when supervisors chose a low wage and another for when 
they chose a high wage. The denominator of the percentage for the low 
(high) wage condition was the number of times that an Employee B had a 
teammate who overstated his/her result when he/she received the low 
(high) wage. The numerator was the number of times the employee B blew 
the whistle in that situation. 
In order to test the hypotheses I ran a repeated-measure ANOVA. The 
results (see Table 4.4 (20), panel A and Figure 4.2 (7)) show that there 
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was a significant direct effect of inter-group RPF (p-value=0.043), but 
there was not a main effect of fairness perception (p-value=0.603), and a 
marginally interaction effect of these factors (p-value=0.081). 
 
TABLE 4.4 (20). REPEATED-MEASURE ANOVA. Effects on 
whistleblowing percentage 
 
PANEL A: MAIN EFFECTS 
 df F p-value 
Fairness perception 
 
1 0.281 0.603 
Inter-group RPF 
 
1 4.784 0.043 
Fairness perception * Inter-
group RPF 
 
1 3.439 0.081 
Error 17   
 
PANEL B: SIMPLE EFFECTS 
 Df F Sig. 
Effect of Fairness perception 
when inter-group RPF is 
absent 
 
1 5.062 0.051 
Effect of Fairness perception 
when inter-group RPF is 
present 
 
1 0.571 0.471 
Effect of inter-group RPF when 
fairness perception is low 
 
1 0.256 0.620 
Effect of inter-group RPF when 
fairness perception is high 
 
1 10.123 0.005 
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Therefore, I did not find support for the hypothesis 1, which predicts a 
positive effect of fairness perception on the likelihood of whistleblowing. 
On the other hand, consistent with the second hypothesis, my results 
showed that the percentage of whistleblowing was significantly lower 
when inter-group RPF was present than when it was absent. Therefore, 
the second hypothesis was supported. 
 





In addition, I found support for hypothesis 3 in this analysis also.  The 
percentage of whistleblowing was significantly higher when the 
supervisor choose a high wage and an inter-group RPF was absent rather 
than present (p-value=0.005). This result suggested that, in spite of 
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they blow the whistle in lower extent when inter-group RPF was present 
than when it was absent. 
Simple effects analysis (see Table 4.4 (20), Panel B) revealed that when 
inter-group RPF was absent, the percentage of whistleblowing was 
significantly higher when the perceived fairness was high than when it 
was low (p-value=0.051). However, when inter-group RPF was present, 
there was no significant difference between when the perceived fairness 
was high or low (p-value=0.471). These results indicated that the positive 
effect that the fairness perception had on the whistleblowing decision 
when inter-group RPF was absent, it was mitigated when an inter-group 
RPF was present. 
Altogether, both analyses suggested that there was a significant 
interaction effect of perceived fairness and inter-group RPF on the 
whistleblowing decision. Consistent with my third hypothesis, in spite that 
individuals perceived that they were treated fairly, they blow the whistle 
less when an inter-group RPF was present than when it was absent. 
Relative to main effects, both analyses did not support hypothesis 1. There 
was not a significant positive relationship between fairness perception 
and whistleblowing decision. The simple effects analysis of my second 
analysis showed that this relationship was positive and significant only 
when inter-group RPF was absent. On the other hand, the main effect 
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4.4.3. Supplemental analysis 
A) Employee A behavior 
According to the social comparison theory, I would expect that when inter-
group RPF is present, Employees A will exert a higher effort or that they 
will be more willing to overstate their results in order to achieve a 
favorable comparison relative to other teams. In this section, I analyze 
these expectations. Table 4.5 (21) shows some descriptive statistics about 
Employee A behavior. 
  
TABLE 4.5 (21). Employee A behavior 



































93.60% 92.85% 93.28% 88.18% 91.55% 89.69% 91.20% 92.25% 91.66% 





































Unlike what social comparison theory could predict, I did not find that the 
effort of the participants was significantly higher when inter-group RPF 
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was present than it was absent (F=1.266, p-value=0.261). However, rather 
than to increase their effort, in order to obtain a positive comparison 
relative to other groups, individuals may be more willing to overstate their 
results. In order to test this, I focused on the honesty in performance 
reporting, the percentage of people who overstate their results and the 
mean overstatement. 
Honesty was measured as “1 – Overstatement / Overstatement Available” 
(Evans, Hannan, Krishnan & Moser, 2001). Individuals were less honest 
(near to significant) when inter-group RPF was present than when it was 
absent (F=2.580, p-value=0.109). The difference in honesty was significant 
between inter-group RPF present versus absent when the wage chosen by 
the supervisor was low (F=3.335, p-value=0.070). It could be explained 
because Employee A could think that Employees B would be less willing to 
peer reporting when the supervisor chose a low wage. However, this 
explanation did not make sense in my experiment, because Employee A 
did not know which the wage chosen by the supervisor was. 
On the other hand, I did not find any significant differences between the 
percentage of people who overstate their results when inter-group RPF 
was absent vs. present (W=0.077, p-value=0.781). However, consistent 
with the social comparison theory, I found that when individuals 
overstated their results, they did it in a significant higher extent when 
inter-group RPF was present than when it was absent (F=3.571, p-
value=0.062). However, like it happened with honesty in performance 
reporting, the significant differences in individual’s overstatements 
between inter-group RPF absent vs. present only happened when the 
supervisor chose a low wage (F=3.780, p-value=0.058). 
An explanation for this unexpected result could be that Employees A 
believed that their peers are not going to report them to the Supervisor. 
Employees A could think that their peers are not going to report them 
CHAPTER 4:  
The Effects of Perceived Fairness and Inter-group Relative Performance 
Feedback on Whistleblowing Decisions 
112 
 
when they observed in previous periods that other Employees B did not 
do it. According to this, I found that individuals’ overstatements were 
significant higher when inter-group RPF was present than when it is 
absent, but only when individual observe that Employee B did not peer 
report in the previous period (F= 5.346, p-value=0.024). Related to this, in 
the post-experimental questionnaire, individuals answer the question: Did 
my expectation about whether Employee B will peer reporting or not 
influence on my decision about overstating or not my results? (scale range 
from 1 to 5). The participants’ mean response for this question was 3.94 
(SD=1.51), significantly differ from the midpoint of 3 (t=3.685, p-
value=0.001). Thus, these results suggested that individuals would 
overstate their results more when inter-group RPF was present according 
to the social comparison theory, when they believed that their peers were 
not going to report this behavior to the supervisor.  Therefore, an 
explanation for this unexpected result could be that it would be more 
likely when individual think that Employee B is not going to peer 
reporting. As the Employees A, the Supervisor could think that the 
Employee B is not going to report peers’ overstatement if they observed 
this in other Employees B in the previous period. However, the results do 
not support this explanation. The previous decision about peer reporting 
did not have a significant influence on the wage chosen by the supervisor 
(W=0.457, p-value=0.499).  
 
4.5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This study tried to extend our knowledge about the factors which affect 
the likelihood that individuals report unethical behaviors internally 
(internal whistleblowing). In a setting in which individuals are not 
rewarded based on their report about peers’ behaviors, a wealth-
maximizing individual never reports others because they are indifferent to 
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outcomes others (Reuben & Stephenson, 2012). However, individuals are 
not only motivated by monetary incentives. Numerous studies have shown 
that individuals are also motivated by reciprocity (Hannan, 2005) and 
social comparisons (Luft & Shields, 2009). In this vein, this study analyzed 
the effect of individuals’ fairness perception of the supervisor and inter-
group RPF on peer reporting decision even though individuals are not 
rewarded for doing so. 
The results of this study generally support hypotheses 2 and 3, which 
predict a negative effect of inter-group RPF and an interaction effect of 
fairness perception and inter-group RPF on whistleblowing decision 
respectively. However, they did not support hypothesis 1, which predicts 
that individuals´ fairness perception of the supervisor affect positively to 
whistleblowing decisions. These results suggest that individuals in order 
to achieve a favorable comparison relative to other teams, will be less 
willing to report peers’ overstatements when inter-group RPF is present 
than when it is absent . Furthermore, when individuals perceive that are 
being treated fairly by their supervisor, they will be less likely to behave in 
a reciprocal way when inter-group RPF is present. The results show that 
when individuals perceive they have been treated fairly by their 
supervisor, they report in lower extent peers’ overstatement when inter-
group RPF is present than when it is absent. In addition, results suggest 
that only when inter-group RPF is absent, individuals will help more the 
organization by whistleblowing when they perceive that are treated fairly 
by the supervisor rather than unfairly (simple effects, second analysis).   
In addition, results show that, according to the social comparison theory, 
individual overstatements will be higher when an inter-group RPF is 
present rather than absent. However, this will happen when individuals 
believe that their peers are not going to report to the supervisor their 
behavior. On the other hand, I found that the individual overstatements 
were significantly higher when inter-group RPF was present than it was 
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absent, whenever the supervisor chose a low wage. This could be 
explained by what the Supervisor believes about whether Employee B is 
going to peer reporting or not.  Therefore, I could expect that it will be 
more likely that the Supervisor chose a low wage when the Employee B 
did not report in the previous period. However, the results did not support 
this explanation. 
Most of the studies about RPF focus on the effects on performance (e. g. 
Hannan et al., 2008; 2013; Murphy & Schafer, 2011; Tafkov, 2013). 
However, it is not only important to understand how inter-group RPF 
affect performance, but also it is important understand how this 
information may affect other individual behaviors. In this vein, this study 
analyzed the effect of RPF (inter-group RPF) on whistleblowing decisions. 
In addition, due to the fact that control systems are implemented together 
other control systems or organizational practices, it is important to 
analyze the interactive effect of different control systems and 
organizational practices (Kelly & tan, 2010). This study contributed to this 
issue by examining the interactive effect of inter-group RPF and 
individuals’ fairness perception of the supervisor. I analyzed the 
individuals’ fairness perception of the principal since it plays an important 
role in whistleblowing decision (Miceli et al., 1991; Zhang, 2008).  
On the other hand, this study has several limitations which should be 
noted. As Zhang’s (2008) study, I assume that employees can perfectly 
observe each other, however in practice, employees only be able to 
imperfectly observe them. Another limitation of this study is the reduced 
sample size. Thus, future research could replicate the experiment with a 
bigger sample. In addition, similar to Zhang (2008), the fairness 
perception in this study is based on how fair individuals perceive the wage 
provided by their supervisor. However, individuals’ fairness perception of 
the supervisor could be based on interpersonal relationships. Thus, future 
research could extend   this issue. Finally, in this study, I only focus on the 
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relationship between the employee who has the opportunity to peer 
reporting and the supervisor. I have not taken into account the 
relationship between this employee with his/her peer and the relationship 
between the employee who overstate his/her result and the supervisor. In 
this vein, future research could extend this study by analyzing: (1) if it 
matter whether the supervisor is fair towards the employee who engaged 
in the misconduct; and (2) if it matter how the relationship is between the 
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusions 
 
5.1. Summary and conclusions 
5.2. Contributions 




5.1. Summary and conclusions 
This dissertation analyzes how management control system design 
influences dysfunctional behaviors. I performed three studies, where I 
analyzed how individuals behave under a specific design of management 
control systems. I also examined how individuals behave when they 
perceive peers’ misconduct.  
My first study examined how individual cognitive orientation affects the 
honesty in performance reporting. In addition, it analyzed whether the 
management control system design moderates this relationship. Results 
showed that individuals who had a predominant individualist cognitive 
orientation were more dishonest when they reported their results. In 
addition, I found that individualists were more dishonest under a 
boundary control system. Previous literature suggested that when 
individuals remind the standards of behaviors and compare them with 
their own behavior, they report their results more honestly (Mazar, Amir 




& Ariely, 2008). However, my results showed that when these standards of 
behaviors are reminded by a restrictive control system, such as boundary 
system, they have negative consequences for individuals’ honesty. This 
negative effect happened when individuals had a predominant 
individualist cognitive orientation.  
My second study analyzed how the information included in a relative 
performance feedback (RPF) influenced individual performance when 
they were rewarded by a group performance-based system. Specifically, I 
analyzed the effect of an intra-group versus inter-group RPF on individual 
performance. Results showed that intra-group RPF influences negatively 
to individual performance. An intra-group RPF could reveal shirking from 
some peers (Coletti, Sedatole & Towry, 2005), and as a consequence, when 
individuals are rewarded by a group incentive system, they reduce their 
effort in order to avoid to be a sucker (Kerr, 1983; Schnake, 1991). 
However, results showed that this negative effect was mitigated when an 
inter-group RPF was present. Thus, we can conclude that in order to 
achieve favorable comparison relative to other teams, individuals will be 
willing to compensate for free-riding of other team members.  
The third study examined the effects of perceived fairness and inter-group 
RPF on whistleblowing decisions when individuals observed dishonesty in 
performance reporting. Specifically, I analyzed these effects when 
individuals did not receive any reward for whistleblowing. I did not find a 
direct relationship between fairness perception and whistleblowing 
decision. Results suggested that when individuals perceived their 
supervisor as fair, their decision about whistleblowing depended on 
whether an inter-group RPF was present or not. Results showed that when 
individuals perceive their supervisor as fair, they were more likely to 
behave in a reciprocal way (by reporting peers’ overstatements) when 
inter-group RPF was absent rather than present. In addition, I found that 
individuals, in order to achieve a favorable comparison relative to other 




teams, were less likely to report peers’ overstatement when an inter-
group RPF was present rather than absent. 
In conclusion, the three studies show that individuals do not behave as 
opportunistically as economic theories predict. Individuals are not only 
motivated by monetary incentives, but also they are motivated by social 
preferences, as it is suggested in previous research (Birnberg, 2011). 
Therefore, when a management control system is designed, it is key to 
take into account this issue. In this vein, this dissertation shows that an 
important social preference for individuals is the social comparison. In 
spite they do not receive any reward for doing so, individuals will behave 
in order to meet a positive comparison relative to others. In addition, it is 
shown that individual decisions will be driven in a higher extent by social 
competition than by reciprocal motives. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that a management control system 
design not always have the same consequences. It could motivate the 
opposite desired behavior in some individuals. Therefore, this dissertation 
suggests that when management control systems are designed, it is not 
only important to take into account the social preferences, but also the 
individual cognitive orientation.   
 
5.2. Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to the management accounting literature in 
several ways. First, the results of my three studies show that individuals 
are not only motivated by monetary incentives, but also they value social 
preferences. Specifically, in this dissertation has been highlighted the 
importance of social comparison on individual behaviors when they 
perceive peers’ dishonest behaviors. In this vein, this study extends 
existent evidence about how individual behaviors are motivated by factors 




different to conventional monetary incentives and suggests that it is 
needed to consider such factors in management control systems design. 
Second, this dissertation extends the previous literature by analyzing not 
only the antecedents of dysfunctional behaviors, but also by analyzing how 
individuals behave when they observe peers’ dishonest behaviors. 
Specifically, I provide evidence about whether individuals follow their 
peers or whether they will be willing to cover them. In this vein, it is 
highlighted the importance that inter-group social comparison plays in 
this issue. Gino, Ayal & Ariely (2009) state that peer influence is an 
important factor in dishonest behaviors. This dissertation shows that the 
effect of the behavior of one particular individual on other individual 
behavior is going to depend on management control system design. 
Specifically, it is suggested that it depends on relative performance 
feedback design. 
Related to the decision about covering peers or whistleblowing, research 
on this issue has found that employees are generally reluctance to report 
peers’ misconduct (Robertson, Stefaniak & Curtis, 2011). However, there 
exist some motivations which could encourage that individuals report 
peers’ opportunistic behaviors (Reuben & Stephenson, 2012). This 
dissertation provides evidence about the motivations which could or could 
not encourage individuals to peer reporting. 
Third, this dissertation contributes to management accounting research by 
analyzing the interactive effects of control systems with other control 
systems; organizational practices; or individual cognitive orientation. In 
organizations, control systems are implemented together other control 
systems and organizational practices (Kelly & Tan, 2010). Thus, it is 
important to understand how a control system influences on individual 
behaviors when other control system is present or in conjunction with a 
specific organizational practice. In this vein, this dissertation analyzes the 




interactive effect of intra-group and inter-group RPF; and the interactive 
effect of inter-group RPF and individual’s perceived fairness. In addition, 
due to the fact that the management control systems could be perceived 
differently by individuals (Tessier & Otley, 2012), I provide evidence about 
the interactive effect of management control system (beliefs versus 
boundary control system) and individualist cognitive orientation. 
This dissertation also has implications for management in practice. 
Management control systems are able to motivate behaviors in individuals 
towards organization’s goals (Henri, 2006; Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 
2007). For organizations, therefore, it is key to understand the effects of 
management control systems. In this vein, this dissertation provides 
evidence about when some management control designs will have a 
positive or negative effect on individual behaviors. Therefore, the results 
of this dissertation could help managers to design suitable management 
control systems in order to motivate individuals to follow organization’s 
goals. 
 
5.3. Limitations and future research 
This dissertation has some limitations which should be noted. Related to 
the empirical methodology used to test my hypotheses a limitation is the 
generalizability of the results to real-world setting. However, I do not 
expect that individuals in organizations respond differently to my 
experimental manipulations, but it is important to note that they face 
other variables that may influence in their behaviors. Thus, the limitation 
may encourage new research avenues. 
Regarding the limitations of my first study I note the following limitations. 
First, when I manipulated boundary system in the experiment, I did not 
include any sanction for the non-compliance of the rules set in such 




system. A boundary system could be ineffective when there are not 
credible sanctions (Coleman, 1990). Thus, future research could analyze 
the effect of boundary system on honesty in performance reporting when 
it is implemented with credible sanctions. Second, Tessier & Otley (2012) 
state that positive and negative control are opposing forces that need to 
coexist in order to ensure effective control. Therefore, it is important to 
analyze the effect of boundary and beliefs systems implemented together.  
Finally, this study focused on the effects of cognitive orientation and 
management control system design in an individual environment. Future 
research should analyze if the results are the same in other environment, 
such as team-based organizations. 
On the other hand, my second study focused on analyzing the effect of 
intra-group versus inter-group RPF on individual behaviors. However, 
other aspects relative to the content of relative performance feedback 
could influence in this relationship. In this study I found an unexpected 
result, inter-group RPF did not have a direct effect on individual 
performance. A plausible explanation is that the positive effect of an inter-
group RPF on individual performance could have been compensated by 
the negative effect that this feedback could have in those individuals who 
perceived to obtain a favorable comparison as unattainable. In this vein, 
the feedback’s level precision could play an important role in the 
perception of individual goals as unattainable (Hannan, Krishnan & 
Newman, 2008). Therefore, further research it is needed in order to 
understand the effect of inter-group RPF on performance.  
Finally, related to my third study I note the following limitations. First, in 
the design of the experiment I assumed that employees observe their 
peers perfectly. However in practice, employees only are able to 
imperfectly observe others. A second limitation is the sample size, which 
could reduce the power of my study. Thus, future research could replicate 
this experiment with a bigger sample. Third, the fairness perception in this 




study is based on how individuals perceive the wage chosen by their 
supervisor. However, individual fairness perception may be based on 
interpersonal relationship also. Future research could analyze the effect of 
fairness perception based on interpersonal relationship. Finally, in this 
study I focus only in the relationship between the potential whistleblower 
and the supervisor. However, it could be interesting analyze also how 
influence in whistleblowing decision: i) how fair the supervisor is with the 
employee who engaged in the misconduct; and ii) how the relationship is 
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APPENDIX: Material for experimental 
studies 
 
1. Support material Study I 
A) Instructions given to the participants 
B) Screens of Z-tree Software 
2. Support material Study II 
A) Instructions given to the participants 
B) Screens of Z-tree Software 
3. Support material Study II 
A) Instructions given to the participants 
B) Screens of Z-tree Software 
 
 
1. Support material Study I 
 
A) Instructions given to the participants 
Please read the following instructions in the next 5 minutes. If you have 
any doubts, ask the people responsible for the activity. 
TASK: The task consists of answering multiple-choice questions. The set of 
questions is composed of a wide variety of categories such as math, 
language, questions of logic and general knowledge. 
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- There is a maximum of 75 questions to be answered. 
- You start at question 1 and move to the next question by clicking 
the OK button. 
- You cannot go back. 
- Each question has 4 possible answers, of which only one is correct. 
- You can also choose not to answer a question and directly move to 
the next question.  
- For each question, you have exactly 20 seconds to provide your 
answer. After these 20 seconds you automatically go to the next 
question, even if you did not yet provide an answer.  
- You have a total of 10 minutes to complete the task. After these 10 
minutes are over, the task finishes automatically, even if you did not 
yet answer all 75 questions. 
- After the task is finished, the computer calculates the number of 
correct answers. 
PAYOFF: The reward you receive will depend on the results of the work 
done in this activity. 
PROCEDURE: You must answer the most questions in the given time. After 
the task is complete, the computer calculates the number of correct 
answers you have obtained. Then you should send a message to the central 
computer to report the number of correct answers. This central computer 
will calculate your final payment and send a message to the computer that 
you occupy informing you of the reward you receive for participating in 
this activity. After you know about your reward, you will be asked to fill in 
a questionnaire. 
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The score you get will not be known by other participants. The researchers 
responsible for this activity or any other person cannot, addition, join the 
responses to any particular individual, due to the fact that you will be 
identified by a code and not by your name. 
 
B) Screens of Z-tree Software 
















2. Support material Study II 
 
A) Instructions given to the participants 
In this activity, you will belong to a team, which will be formed by three 
people. Team members will be chosen randomly by the computer. You will 
not able to know who belong to your team. The team aim is to achieve the 
APPENDIX 
Material for experimental studies 
135 
 
highest possible production. The production of the team will be 
determined by the addition of individual productions of each team 
member. 
Example: 
MEMBER A PRODUCTION 3 
MEMBER B PRODUCTION 6 
MEMBER C PRODUCTION 1 
TEAM PRODUCTION 10 
 
TASK DESCRIPTION: 
The task in this activity will be the same for all participants. This task 
consists in solving multiplication problems for 9 independent rounds. In 
each round, you will have 6 multiplication problems. For each problem, 
5 possible answers will be provided. You will have to choose the answer 
which you think it is correct. It is possible to pass to the next round even 
when all problems have not been solved. 
In this activity, it is not allowed to use mobile phone or calculator. 
Solving multiplication problems accurately and quickly requires not 
only mechanical skills, but also general problem-solving ability.  
To perform this task you will be allotted 5 minutes (300 seconds) per 
round. You can know the time by a clock which will be in the upper right 
part of your screen in each round. 
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Your team aim is to solve the maximum number of problems in the 
given time. That is, your aim will be to maximize the production of your 
team. 
After each round, you will receive information about how many 
problems you have solved correctly in the current round and 
cumulatively. 
Every three rounds you will receive information about your team 
production and profit. Specifically, you will receive information about the 
benefit and the number of problems solved correctly by you and by your 
teammates. Also, you will know the profit and the number of problems 
solved correctly by your team in total in these rounds.4 
In addition, every three rounds you will receive information about your 
team production and profit, as well as the rest of teams which participate 
in this activity. That is, you will know how many problems your team has 
solved correctly and your team profit in comparison with the rest of 
teams which participate in this activity.5 
Multiplication problem example: 
21 x 300 




                                                          
4
 This paragraph is only included in the instructions of the condition in which intra-group RPF 
is present. 
5
 This paragraph is only included in the instructions of the condition in which inter-group RPF 
is present. 
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Your reward in this activity will depend on both the number of problems 
solved correctly by you as your team. 
In this activity, all monetary figures will be expressed in LECU (“Lab 
Experimental Currency Unit”), an experimental currency used in this lab 
(100 LECUS = 1 EURO). 
Your team profit will be compounded by a fix part and a variable part 
which will depend on the results achieved by your team. Your team will 
receive a fix income of 1500 LECUS only for participating in this activity 
(that is, only for participating, each team member will receive 500 LECUS). 
In addition, the team profit will be increased proportionally to the number 
of problems solved correctly by your team members. Specifically, your 
team will obtain 30 LECUS for each multiplication problem solved 
correctly by your team members. The total team profit (fix part + 
proportional part to the problems solved by team members) will be 
divided in equal parts between each team member, regardless the 
number of problems solved correctly by each one of them. 
Each team member will have a production cost, which will be 
proportional to the number of problems solved correctly by him/her. 
Specifically, each team member will have a cost of 10 LECUS for each 
multiplication problem solved correctly. 
• TEAM PROFIT= 1500 + (30 x (problems solved by member A + 
problems solved by member B + problems solved by member 
C)) 
• PRODUCTION COST OF MEMBER i = 10 x problems solved by 
member i 
• MEMBER i BENEFIT =  (TEAM PROFIT / 3) – PRODUCTION COST 
OF MEMBER i 
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Problems solved by the team = 10 
Problems solved by member A = 4 
Problems solved by member B = 6 
Problems solved by member A = 0 
 
TEAM PROFIT = 1500 + (30 x (4 + 6 + 0)) = 1800 LECUS 
MEMBER A BENEFIT = (1800 / 3) – (10 x 4) = 560 LECUS 
MEMBER B BENEFIT = (1800 / 3) – (10 x 6) = 540 LECUS 
MEMBER C BENEFIT = (1800 / 3) – (10 x 0) = 600 LECUS 
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3. Support material Study III 
 
A) Instructions given to the participants 
In this activity, you belong to a three people team. Specifically, two team 
members will play the role of employee and another one will play the role 
of supervisor. Team members and their roles will be chosen randomly by 
the computer. It will not able to know who belong to your team. This 
activity is completely anonymous, we will never be able to link the 
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decision made to a concrete individual. You will be identified by a code 
which matches with the position in which you are sitting rather than by 
your name. 
Each participant will have the same role during all activity (8 periods). 
However, in each period the team members will change. The team 
members will be matched again randomly by the computer. That is, your 
teammates will change in each period. 
The team aim is to obtain the maximum possible performance in each 
period. Team performance will be determined by the performance of one 
team member who plays the role of employee. Only one of the employees 
will have to perform a task and his/her result in this task will determinate 
the team performance. 
In each period, you will receive information about your team performance 
and about the team performance of other teams which participate in this 
activity. That is, in each period you will know how many points your 
team has obtained in comparison with the other teams which 
participate in the activity.6 
 
Instructions for employees A 
In this activity, you will play the role of employee (EMPLOYEE A). Your 
team is composed by two people more. One of them will play the role of 
SUPERVISOR and another one will play also the role of employee 
(EMPLOYEE B). 
Your task in this activity consists of a screen with several sliders. Each 
slider is initially positioned at 0 and can be moved as far as 100. Each 
                                                          
6
 This paragraph is only included in the instructions of the condition in which inter-group RPF 
is present. 
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slider has a number to its right showing its current position. Use your 
mouse to move the slider. You can readjust the position of each slider as 
many times as you wish. Your team will receive a point for each slider 
that you position at exactly 50. In order to perform this task, you will be 
allotted 2 minutes (120 seconds) per period. You can know the time by a 
clock which you can see in the upper right part of your screen in each 
period. The team aim is to meet the maximum points in the task in 
each period. Thus, your aim will be to maximize your team 
performance. 
After the task ends up, you will receive information about the number of 
points that you have obtained. After this, you have to communicate how 
many points you obtained. Your rewards will depend on the number of 
points that you report. Note that the computer will not check whether 
your reporting matches the actual points that you obtained. This only 
will happen if the EMPLOYEE B decides that you must be revised. Thus, 
your team performance will be the number of points that you report 
or your actual performance in the case that EMPLOYEE B decide that 
you must be revised. 
EMPLOYEE B will observe both your actual points obtained as your 
reported points. When you report a number of points higher than your 
actual points, EMPLOYEE B will have the opportunity to decide that you 
will be revised. If this happens, you will be rewarded by your actual points 
(not by your reported points) and you will be fined. However, EMPLOYEE 
B will not receive any reward for deciding that you will be revised. 
That is, EMPLOYEE B reward does not depend on his/her decision about if 
you have to be revised or not. His/her rewards will be the same 
regardless his/her decision. 
Therefore, your reward will depend on your result in the task or the 
number of points that you report and on the EMPLOYEE B decision. 
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Specifically, in each period you will receive a fix reward (1100 LECUS) 
and a variable reward which depends on the number of points that you 
have reported or you actually have obtained (depending on the decision of 
EMPLOYEE B). Specifically, your variable reward will be determined by: 
- If EMPLOYEE B decides that you do not have to be revised: 10 x 
reported points 
- If EMPLOYEE B decides that you have to be revised: 10 x actual 
points – 800 
IMPORTANT! YOUR FINAL PAYOFF WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE 
REWARD OBTAINED IN ONE OF THE 8 PERIODS. THIS REWARD WILL 
BE CHOSEN RANDOMLY BY THE COMPUTER 
Examples: 
1. Assume that: 
- You obtain 20 points, but you decide to report that your result 
was 40 points. 
- EMPLOYEE B decides that you will be not revised 
Therefore, your reward will be: 1100 (fix reward) + 10 x 40 (variable 
reward) = 1500 LECUS 
2. Assume that: 
- You obtain 20 points, but you decide to report that your result 
was 40 points. 
- EMPLOYEE B decides that you will be revised 
Therefore, your reward will be: 1100 (fix reward) + 10 x 20 - 800 (variable 
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Instructions for employees B 
In this activity you will play the role of employee (EMPLOYEE B). Your 
team is composed by two people more. One of them will play the role of 
SUPERVISOR and another one will play also the role of employee 
(EMPLOYEE A). 
EMPLOYEE A will perform a task. The result of this task will determine 
the team performance. This employee will communicate his/her result 
and he/she will be rewarded by this report. Your team performance will 
be the result reported by EMPLOYEE A or the actual result of 
EMPLOYEE A if you decide that EMPLOYEE A must be revised.7 
You will observe both the actual result obtained by EMPLOYEE A as the 
reported result. If the EMPLOYEE A communicates that he/she obtained 
more points than he/she actually obtained, you will have the 
opportunity to ask that EMPLOYEE A will be revised. If you decide this, 
EMPLOYEE A will be rewarded by his/her actual result (not by the 
reported result) and he/she will be fined. Thus, your task in this activity is 
to decide whether EMPLOYEE A must be revised or not. 
Your reward in each period will be determined by YOUR SUPERVISOR. 
Your supervisor will chose a fixed wage for you in each period.  
Your SUPERVISOR will choose a wage which will range between 650 
LECUS and 1450 LECUS. Thus, the minimum wage that you will receive 
will be 650 LECUS and the maximum 1450 LECUS. Your SUPERVISOR 
will choose a wage between these two amounts. 
Your SUPERVISOR reward in each period will be determined by the 
EMPLOYEE A results, your wage and the EMPLOYEE A wage. Specifically, 
                                                          
7
 This sentence is only included in the instructions of the condition in which inter-group RPF is 
present. 
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SUPERVISOR will receive a fix reward and a variable reward, which will 
depends on the team performance. In addition, the SUPERVISOR reward 
will be reduced by your wage and by the EMPLOYEE A wage. 
IMPORTANT! YOUR FINAL PAYOFF WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE 
REWARD OBTAINED IN ONE OF THE 8 PERIODS. THIS REWARD WILL 
BE CHOSEN RANDOMLY BY THE COMPUTER 
Examples: 
1. Assume that: 
- Your SUPERVISOR chose a wage for you of 650 LECUS. 
- EMPLOYEE A obtain 20 points in the task, but decides to report 
that he/she obtained 40 points 
- You decides that EMPLOYEE A will be revised 
Therefore you reward will be: 650 LECUS 
Your SUPERVISOR reward will be: 3050 (fix reward) – 650 (your wage) – 
(1100+ (10 x 20 – 800) (EMPLOYEE A wage) + 15 x 20 (variable reward) = 
2200 LECUS 
2. Assume that:  
- Your SUPERVISOR chose a wage for you of 1450 LECUS. 
- EMPLOYEE A obtain 20 points in the task, but decides to report 
that he/she obtained 40 points 
- You decides that EMPLOYEE A will not be revised 
Therefore you reward will be: 1450 LECUS 
Your SUPERVISOR reward will be: 3050 (fix reward) – 1450 (your wage) – 
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Instructions for supervisors 
In this activity, you will play the role of SUPERVISOR. Your team is 
composed by two people more, which will play the role of employees. One 
of these employees (EMPLOYEE A) will perform a task and his/her result 
in this task will determine your team performance. This employee will 
report the points that he/she obtained in the task and he/she will be 
rewarded by these points. 
The other employee (EMPLOYEE B) will observe both the actual points 
obtained by EMPLOYEE A as the reported points. If EMPLOYEE A report 
that he obtained more points that he actually obtained, EMPLOYEE B 
will have the opportunity to ask that EMPLOYEE A will be revised. If this 
happens, EMPLOYEE A will be rewarded by his/her actual result (not by 
the reported result) and he/she will be fined. 
Your task in this activity will be to choose the wage for EMPLOYEE B. 
That is, you will have to decide which will be the wage for EMPLOYEE B in 
each period. You have to decide a wage for the EMPLOYEE B which range 
between 650 LECUS and 1450 LECUS. Therefore, the minimum wage that 
you can choose for EMPLOYEE B is 650 LECUS and the maximum 1450 
LECUS. That is, you have to choose a wage between these two amounts. 
Your reward in each period will be determined by the results of 
EMPLOYEE A and both employees’ wages.  
In each period, you will receive a fix reward (3050 LECUS) and a reward 
which will depend on your team performance (15 points for each 
point obtained). On the other hand, as supervisor of your team, you must 
pay the wages of your team employees.  
As you read previously, the EMPLOYEE B wage will be chosen by you 
(between 650 LECUS and 1450 LECUS).  
APPENDIX 
Material for experimental studies 
147 
 
On the other hand, EMPLOYEE A wage will be a fix reward (1100 
LECUS) and a variable reward which depends on the points that 
EMPLOYEE A communicates that he/she has obtained or on the points 
actually obtained whether the EMPLOYEE B decides that EMPLOYEE A 
will be revised. Specifically, the variable reward of EMPLOYEE A will be 
determined in the following way: 
- If EMPLOYEE B decides that EMPLOYEE A will not be revised: 
10 x reported points  
- If EMPLOYEE B decides that EMPLOYEE A will be revised: 10 x 
actual points – 800 
IMPORTANT! YOUR FINAL PAYOFF WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE 
REWARD OBTAINED IN ONE OF THE 8 PERIODS. THIS REWARD WILL 
BE CHOSEN RANDOMLY BY THE COMPUTER 
Examples: 
1. Assume that: 
- You choose a wage for EMPLOYEE B of 650 LECUS. 
- EMPLOYEE A obtain 20 points in the task, but decides to report 
that he/she obtained 40 points 
- EMPLOYEE B decides that EMPLOYEE A will be revised 
Therefore you reward will be: 3050 (fix reward) – 650 (your wage) – 
(1100+ (10 x 20 – 800) (EMPLOYEE A wage) + 15 x 20 (variable reward) = 
2200 LECUS 
2. Assume that: 
- You choose a wage for EMPLOYEE B of 1450 LECUS. 
- EMPLOYEE A obtain 20 points in the task, but decides to report 
that he/she obtained 40 points 
- EMPLOYEE B decides that EMPLOYEE A will not be revised 
Therefore you reward will be: 3050 (fix reward) – 1450 (EMPLOYEE B 
wage) – (1100+ (10 x 40) (EMPLOYEE A wage) + 15 x 20 (variable 
reward) = 400 LECUS 
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Esta tesis analiza cómo el diseño de los sistemas de control de gestión 
influye en los comportamientos disfuncionales en las organizaciones. Con 
este fin, se han llevado a cabo tres estudios experimentales. En el primero, 
son contrastadas las hipótesis relacionadas con cómo la (des)honestidad a 
la hora de reportar los resultados es influenciada por la relación entre el 
diseño de los sistemas de control de gestión (sistema de creencias vs. 
sistema de fronteras) y la orientación cognitiva hacia el individualismo. El 
segundo estudio, se centra en analizar cómo la información sobre el 
rendimiento relativo (relative performance feedback: RPF) afecta al 
rendimiento individual. Por último, el tercer estudio analiza el efecto de la 
percepción de justicia de un individuo sobre su supervisor y de un sistema 
de información de rendimiento relativo de diferentes equipos (inter-group 
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RPF) en la decisión de un individuo de reportar las conductas 
disfuncionales de sus compañeros de trabajo. 
Esta tesis combina teorías económicas con teorías psicológicas. Aquellos 
sistemas de control que son diseñados basándose en la premisa de que 
todos los individuos actúan oportunistamente para maximizar sus 
beneficios no son siempre óptimos (Hannan, 2005; Rankin, Schwartz & 
Young, 2008; Rigdon, 2009). La Teoría Económica tradicional asume que 
los individuos sólo son motivados por su propio interés y por la 
maximización de sus ganancias (Birnberg, 2011). Sin embargo, la 
literatura contable conductual subraya que los individuos no se comportan 
totalmente de manera egoísta, sino que ellos actúan conforme ciertas 
normas tales como la justicia, la equidad, la confianza, la honestidad o la 
disposición a cooperar (Birnberg, 2011). Por tanto, es necesario integrar la 
psicología en el marco contable para entender mejor cómo los individuos 
son motivados en las organizaciones a través de los sistemas de control de 
gestión. 
 
B) Comportamientos disfuncionales en las 
organizaciones 
En las organizaciones, los individuos deciden si actuar en favor de sus 
propios intereses o en favor del beneficio común de su grupo u 
organización (Probst, Carneavale & Triandis, 1999). En este sentido, los 
empleados pueden comportarse de manera disfuncional con el objeto de 
conseguir sus propios intereses. Los comportamientos disfuncionales 
pueden ser definidos como aquellos comportamientos que son llevados a 
cabo por un individuo o grupo de individuos que tienen consecuencias 
negativas para otro individuo, grupo o la propia organización (Griffin & 
Lopez, 2005). 
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Esta tesis examina los efectos del diseño de los sistemas de control de 
gestión en los comportamientos deshonestos, los cuales no sólo pueden 
tener consecuencias negativas para la organización, sino que también 
puede perjudicar a otros empleados o compañeros de equipo. Esta tesis se 
centra en el análisis de dos comportamientos deshonestos: (i) uno que 
tendrá consecuencias negativas para la organización (deshonestidad a la 
hora de reportar los resultados); y (ii) otro que además tiene 
consecuencias negativas para los compañeros de equipo (problema del 
polizón o free-riding). 
Las preocupaciones sobre la honestidad en los informes gerenciales o a la 
hora de comunicar resultados han sido ampliamente reconocidas en la 
literatura contable (Birnberg, 2011; Mittendorf, 2006). En las 
organizaciones los individuos tienen información privada que pueden usar 
para su propio beneficio. Relacionado con esto, las teorías económicas 
sugieren que los individuos son deshonestos cuando obtienen beneficios 
porello (Gneezy, 2005; Rankin et al., 2008). Sin embargo, varios estudios 
han encontrado que las personas no son totalmente deshonestas como ha 
sido predicho por la teoría de la agencia (Evans, Hannan, Krishnan & 
Moser, 2001; Hannan, Rankin & Towry, 2006; Rankin et al., 2008). Una 
explicación para estos resultados es que los individuos no sólo tienen 
preferencias por los beneficios que ellos obtienen de su comportamiento 
deshonesto, sino también de su comportamiento honesto (Luft, 1997; 
Birnberg, 2011). 
Por otro lado, el incremento de estructuras organizativas basadas en 
equipos (Kozolowski & Ilgen, 2006)  ha aumentado el  interés de los 
investigadores por los comportamientos disfuncionales en los equipos. El 
mero hecho de adoptar una estructura basada en equipos no lleva a una 
mejora del rendimiento. Por el contrario, estas estructuras pueden llevar a 
pérdidas de motivación y coordinación (Schnake, 1991; Wegge & Haslam, 
2005), las cuales pueden tener como consecuencia la aparición de 
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comportamientos disfuncionales. La holgazanería social (social loafing) y 
el problema del polizón (free-riding) son dos de los principales 
comportamientos disfuncionales que tienen lugar en los equipos (Kidwell 
& Bennet, 1993; Schnake, 1991; Wegge & Haslam, 2005). Rowe (2004) 
establece que la holgazanería social surge cuando todos los miembros del 
equipo reducen sus contribuciones al rendimiento grupal en un mismo 
grado. Por otro lado, se considera que un individuo se está comportando 
como un polizón (free-rider) cuando se beneficia del rendimiento grupal 
sin contribuir a él (Rowe, 2004). 
En la literatura contable, varios estudios se han centrado en los 
antecedentes de estos comportamientos disfuncionales y en cómo 
mitigarlos (ej. Hannan et al., 2006; Kidwell & Bennet, 1993; Maas & Van 
Rinsum, 2013; Rowe, 2004; Rowe, Birnberg & Shields, 2008). Sin embargo, 
poca investigación se ha centrado en analizar cómo los individuos se 
comportan cuando perciben o conocen que sus compañeros se están 
comportando de manera disfuncional (Mulvey & Klein, 1998; Tata, 2002). 
Extender la literatura en relación con esta cuestión es clave ya que los 
comportamientos de un individuo concreto pueden tener consecuencias 
importantes en los comportamientos de sus compañeros, tales como la 
honestidad (Gino, Ayal, Ariely, 2009) y el rendimiento individual (Schnake, 
1991; Tata, 2002). 
La percepción de que uno o varios miembros del equipo están 
contribuyendo al grupo menos de lo que ellos podrían tiene implicaciones 
significativas para el rendimiento del equipo (Tata, 2002). Cuando una 
persona conoce o percibe que su compañero de equipo se está 
comportando como un free-rider, puede decidir reducir sus esfuerzos para 
evitar ser explotado por su compañero de equipo (Kerr, 1983; Schnake, 
1991). Este efecto es conocido en su terminología inglesa como el sucker 
effect. Por tanto, no sólo es importante analizar cómo el diseño de los 
sistemas de control de gestión influye en los comportamientos 
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disfuncionales, sino también cómo influye en los comportamientos de los 
individuos cuando ellos observan comportamientos disfuncionales por 
parte de sus compañeros.   
Sin embargo, cuando los individuos observan el comportamiento 
disfuncional de otros empleados, los sistemas de control de gestión no sólo 
pueden influir en el rendimiento individual, sino también en otros 
comportamientos y decisiones, tales como la decisión sobre si informar o 
no de los comportamientos de sus compañeros (peer reporting). El Peer 
reporting genera diversas y conflictivas opiniones (Reuben & Stephenson, 
2012). En la literatura, algunos estudios sugieren que existen ciertos 
motivos que pueden fomentar que las personas informen de los 
comportamientos deshonestos de sus compañeros (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; 
Reuben & Stephenson, 2012). Sin embargo, existen otros estudios que 
muestran que los empleados son generalmente reacios a comunicar tales 
conductas (Robertson, Stefaniak & Crutis, 2011). Por tanto, se hace 
necesario ampliar la investigación relacionada con esta cuestión con el 
objetivo de entender qué factores afectan y cómo a esta decisión. 
 
C) El diseño de los sistemas de control de gestión 
Los sistemas de control de gestión son capaces de incentivar y motivar a 
los individuos a comportarse en pro de los intereses de la organización. 
(Henri, 2006; Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 2007). Por tanto, un adecuado 
diseño de los sistemas de control de gestión podrían reducir los 
comportamientos disfuncionales en las organizaciones. En este sentido, es 
importante entender cómo diferentes diseños de los sistemas de control 
de gestión influyen en los comportamientos disfuncionales en las 
organizaciones.  
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Esta tesis, basándose en el marco de las palancas de control de Simons 
(1995), analiza cómo el diseño de los sistemas de control de gestión afecta 
a los comportamientos disfuncionales. Además, basándose en la 
investigación sobre la información del rendimiento relativo, esta tesis 
examina cómo los individuos reaccionan a los comportamientos 
disfuncionales de sus compañeros. 
En esta tesis, se intenta extender el marco de Simons a los 
comportamientos individuales en las organizaciones. Simons (1995) 
define cuatro tipos de sistemas de control de gestión: sistema de creencias, 
sistema de fronteras, sistema de control diagnóstico y sistema de control 
interactivo. Esta tesis se centra en los sistemas de control de gestión 
relacionados con el diseño: sistema de creencias y sistema de fronteras. El 
sistema de creencias es utilizado para definir, comunicar y reforzar los 
valores, propósitos y dirección de la organización (Simons, 1995). Por otro 
lado, el sistema de fronteras comunica las acciones que tiene que ser 
evitadas (Simons, 1995). Es decir, establece límites explícitos y reglas que 
deben ser respetadas (Simons, 1995). Ambos sistemas facilitan que los 
individuos comparen los comportamientos deseados con los suyos 
propios. Este hecho motiva a los individuos a reducir sus 
comportamientos disfuncionales (Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008). Por tanto, 
los sistemas de creencias y de fronteras podrían ser utilizados para 
disminuir los comportamientos no deseables (Widener, 2007). Sin 
embargo, estos sistemas de control no funcionan de igual forma en todos 
los individuos (Scott, 2011), ya que las personas tienen diferentes 
respuestas emocionales y orientaciones cognitivas hacia el control (Drach-
Zahavy, 2004; Tessier & Otley, 2012). 
Por otro lado, la investigación relativa a la información sobre el 
rendimiento relativo se ha centrado en analizar los efectos que 
proporcionar esta información tiene en el rendimiento. Para este fin, la 
mayoría de los estudios se han centrado principalmente en la teoría de 
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comparación social. Esta teoría sugiere que la relación entre la 
información sobre el rendimiento relativo tendrá un efecto positivo en el 
rendimiento (Hannan, Krishnan & Newman, 2008; Tafkov, 2013). Sin 
embargo, podrían existir factores que moderarán esta relación. En este 
sentido, Hannan et al. (2008) encontró que la información sobre el 
rendimiento relativo no siempre influye de forma positiva en el 
rendimiento, sino que va a depender del sistema de incentivos utilizado. 
La información sobre el rendimiento relativo fomenta la comparación 
social (Tafkov, 2013) y el efecto que dicha comparación social tiene en el 
rendimiento individual puede depender de cómo los individuos son 
recompensados (Hannan et al., 2008; Tafkov, 2013). Investigaciones 
previas han encontrado que la información sobre el rendimiento relativo 
influye positivamente en el rendimiento cuando los individuos son 
recompensados por un salario fijo o por un sistema basado en el 
rendimiento individual. Sin embargo, se han encontrado evidencias de que 
dicha información influye negativamente cuando los individuos son 
recompensados por un sistema de incentivos basado en la competición y la 
información proporcionada sobre el rendimiento relativo es 
suficientemente precisa (Hannan et al., 2008). Por tanto, es importante y 
necesaria una mayor investigación sobre cuando la información sobre el 
rendimiento relativo tendrá un efecto positivó en el rendimiento.  
Además, atendiendo a que la información sobre el rendimiento relativo 
fomenta la competición (Garcia & Tor, 2007; Tafkov, 2013), dicha 
información podría afectar a otros comportamientos diferentes al 
rendimiento individual, que afectaran a cómo los individuos se ven a ellos 
mismos en comparación con otros. Motivados por la competición, la 
decisión de un individuo sobre si cubrir o no a su compañero puede 
depender de si esta decisión influye en la obtención de comparaciones 
favorables en relación con otros. Por lo que es importante ampliar la 
literatura contable en este aspecto. 
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D) Preguntas de investigación y contribuciones 
Esta tesis intenta responder a las siguientes preguntas de investigación: 
(1) ¿Cómo el diseño de los sistemas de control de gestión influye en los 
comportamientos disfuncionales? 
(2) ¿Cómo el diseño de los sistemas de control de gestión influye en los 
comportamientos de los individuos cuando observan que sus 
compañeros se están comportando de manera disfuncional? 
Para responder a estas preguntas he llevado a cabo tres estudios. El 
primer estudio se centra en examinar cómo la (des)honestidad a la hora de 
reportar el rendimiento es influenciado por la relación entre el diseño de 
los sistemas de control de gestión (sistema de creencias vs. sistema de 
fronteras) y la orientación cognitiva hacia el individualismo. Los 
resultados de este estudio muestran que: (i) la orientación cognitiva 
individualista influye negativamente a la honestidad a la hora de reportar 
el rendimiento; y que (ii) esta relación es moderada por un sistema de 
control de fronteras. Los individualistas informarán menos honestamente 
de sus resultados cuando existe un sistema de fronteras en lugar de un 
sistema de creencias. 
El segundo estudio analiza cómo la información sobre el rendimiento 
relativo afecta al rendimiento individual cuando los individuos trabajan en 
equipo y son recompensados por un sistema de incentivos grupal. Los 
resultados muestran que el efecto negativo que tiene proporcionar 
información sobre el rendimiento de otros miembros del equipo es 
mitigado cuando se proporciona además información sobre el rendimiento 
de los equipos. 
Finalmente, el tercer estudio examina los efectos de la justicia percibida de 
un empleado sobre su supervisor y de la información sobre el rendimiento 
relativo de varios equipos en la decisión de reportar los comportamientos 
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deshonestos de los compañeros. Los resultados sugieren que: (i) cuando 
es proporcionada información sobre el rendimiento de varios equipos, los 
individuos están menos dispuestos a comunicar los comportamientos 
deshonestos de sus compañeros; y que (ii) cuando los individuos perciben 
a sus supervisores como justos, ellos estarán menos dispuestos a reportar 
las conductas deshonestas de sus compañeros cuando se proporciona 
información relativa de los rendimientos de varios equipos. 
Para contrastar las hipótesis planteadas en cada uno de los estudios, se 
llevaron a cabo tres experimentos (uno por cada estudio). Los 
experimentos son un mecanismo útil y adecuado para analizar las 
relaciones causales bajo condiciones puras y no contaminadas (Kerlinger 
& Lee, 2000). Los participantes de estos experimentos fueron estudiantes 
de la Universidad Pablo de Olavide en Sevilla (España). La elección de 
dichos participantes se debe al hecho de que no era necesaria ninguna 
habilidad específica ni tener experiencia previa para realizar las tareas 
diseñadas en cada uno de los experimentos. 
Esta tesis contribuye a la literatura de contabilidad de gestión de varias 
formas. Primero, esta investigación extiende el marco de Simons (1995) a 
los comportamientos individuales en las organizaciones, más allá del 
control estratégico. En concreto, es mostrado cómo el diseño de los 
sistemas de control de gestión influye en la motivación de los empleados, 
pregunta que el marco de Simons deja sin respuesta (Adler & Chen, 2011). 
Hasta mi conocimiento, este es el primer estudio que analiza 
empíricamente el efecto de un sistema de creencias y un sistema de 
fronteras en comportamientos disfuncionales. Segundo, esta tesis 
contribuye a la demanda existente en la literatura contable sobre qué 
factores influyen en la honestidad y cómo sistemas de control diferentes a 
los convencionales sistemas de incentivos monetarios afectan al 
comportamiento deshonesto (Evans et al., 2001). Tercero, en línea con la 
reciente investigación, los resultados de esta tesis muestran que las 
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personas no sólo valoran sus propios pagos materiales, sino que también 
son motivados por preferencias sociales.  
Además, esta tesis extiende la investigación previa en contabilidad de 
gestión analizando no sólo cómo el diseño de los sistemas de control afecta 
a los comportamientos disfuncionales, sino además analizando cómo 
afectan a las reacciones de los individuos cuando ellos observan 
comportamientos disfuncionales llevados a cabo por sus compañeros. Por 
último, teniendo en cuenta que los sistemas de control de gestión son 
implementados en las organizaciones junto con otros sistemas de control 
o prácticas organizativas (Kelly & Tan, 2010), esta tesis contribuye a la 
literatura analizando el efecto interactivo de diferentes sistemas de 
control y prácticas organizativas.  
Esta tesis tiene también implicaciones prácticas. Los resultados sugieren 
que las organizaciones deberían tener en cuenta la orientación cognitiva 
predominante de los individuos cuando diseñen los sistemas de control de 
gestión. Un sistema de control de gestión que impone límites coactivos 
puede fomentar sentimientos de resistencia psicológica (psychological 
reactance) en individuos con una orientación cognitiva hacia el 
individualismo. Además, los resultados de esta tesis muestran que 
diferentes diseños de la información influyen en las decisiones de los 
individuos sobre: (i) si seguir el comportamiento del compañero, 
comportándose por tanto de forma disfuncional también; y sobre (ii) si 
informar a los superiores sobre los comportamientos deshonestos de sus 
compañeros.  
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